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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Most industrialized countries recognize the problem of local industries that are threatened by cheap imported products. Like most of
these countries, the European Economic Community (EEC) has special
trade protection legislation designed to protect its industries from
these "dumped," i.e., extremely cheap, imports. The most popular
protective measure in EEC anti-dumping legislation is the undertaking.
An anti-dumping undertaking is a deal between the exporters of
a dumped product and the Commission of the European Communities.
In the undertaking, the exporters promise to stop dumping, in other
words, to raise their prices. In return, the Commission will not impose
financial penalties on the imported products. When properly used, the
Commission, the protected EEC industries and the exporters can all
benefit from the use of undertakings.
Yet these useful devices give rise to interesting legal problems.
For instance, if the Commission encourages a number of exporters to
conclude an undertaking and to raise their prices, it is, in effect,
encouraging the collective setting of a minimum price. This competition
tactic is normally forbidden by article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty),' without the possibility of the waivers cited in article 85(3).2 Another competition problem is that as soon as foreign products are subjected to minimum
prices, EEC producers will be able to undercut these prices systematically.
A second category of problems is formed by undertakings that
eliminate dumping, or the injury to the EEC industry resulting
thereof, through quantitative limitations on exports, for example
through obligations to limit imports or to cease imports in the EEC
altogether. It is not certain whether and to what extent the Commission has the authority to conclude undertakings containing quotas or
import stopage.

1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) at art. 85(1) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Id. art. 85(3).
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This article will try to clarify the legal situation with regard to
undertakings in EEC anti-dumping law. It will examine the current
law and practice of the EEC with regard to undertakings in general
and to the specific questions concerning undertakings that were introduced above.
To achieve this end, this article is divided into two main parts.
Part I provides background information on the EEC system of antidumping law. It describes the legislative history of anti-dumping law,
its relationship to other forms of trade protection law, its main substantive and procedural features relevant to undertakings, and the possibilities for judicial review.
Part II concentrates on undertakings. It describes how undertakings fit into the framework of substantive and procedural law, and
judicial protection described in part I. It will also examine the relationship between undertakings in anti-dumping law and competition law
on one hand, and the Commission's powers to negotiate quotas on the
other.
II.

PART

I: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
OF UNDERTAKINGS

A.

Introduction

Part I provides general information on EEC anti-dumping law that
is necessary to fully understand the legal aspects of undertakings. It
describes the economic and legal environment in which EEC antidumping law operates. This environment can be divided into three
aspects, each of which has its own relevance to the main subject of
undertakings: (1) its legal foundation; 3 (2) its economic foundation; 4 (3)
its legal constraints. 5
Secondly, part I describes the substantive relevance to the antidumping law of EEC undertakings. This paragraph contains two main
parts: (1) the conditions that must be fulfilled before anti-dumping

3. This covers the Treaty basis of anti-dumping law and the other forms of EEC trade
protection legislation. This will show the special importance of anti-dumping legislation and
therefore also of undertakings, since these are the most often used anti-dumping measures.
4. This covers the reasons both for dumping and for taking anti-dumping action. This will
show why anti-dumping protective measures, such as undertakings, are adopted, but also their
potential for abuse.
5. This covers the international legislation designed to counter that abuse. This will show
the importance of the so called GATT Anti-Dumping Code, with which all EEC anti-dumping
measures must comply.
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measures can be taken and the way they are elaborated;6 (2) the
anti-dumping protective measures themselves.7
Thirdly, part I describes the anti-dumping procedure used by the
EEC, and the EEC institutions that play a role in the procedure.
This part also describes the different phases of an anti-dumping proceeding, including the initiation of an investigation usually through a
complaint, the conduct of the investigation itself, and the conclusion
of the investigation.
Finally, part I describes the possibilities for judicial review of the
outcome of an anti-dumping procedure. This paragraph briefly describes the different ways of obtaining judicial review in the EEC and
the various possible outcomes of an anti-dumping procedure. A comparison is then made between the possibilities for judicial review of
undertakings on one hand, and of the other ways to end an anti-dumping proceeding on the other.
B.

The Origins of Anti-Dumping in the EEC

1. Treaty Basis of Trade Protection Legislation
Article 3(b) of the EEC Treaty lists as one of the objectives of
the Community "the establishment of a common commercial policy
towards third countries." 8 The legal basis of anti-dumping legislation
is article 113(1) declaring this common commercial policy to be an
exclusive power of the Community. 9 According to article 113(1), "measures taken to protect trade such as those to be taken in cases of
dumping or subsidies" are among the subjects of the common commercial policy. 10 The same article makes it clear that these trade protection
measures must be taken by the Council, acting by a qualified majority
on proposals from the Commission.1
2.

Types of Trade Protection Legislation

Article 113 has given rise to five types of trade protection measures:
(1) anti-dumping measures;1 2 (2) countervailing, or anti-subsidy, meas-

6. This will show the large discretionary powers of the Commission.
7. Undertakings described in part II are not included in this section.
8. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(b).
9. Id. art. 113(1).
10. Id.

11.
12.

Id.

See EEC Reg. 2423/8 (O.J. 1988, L209/1) (a copy of this regulation is included infra at
Appendix 1) [hereinafter Appendix 1].
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ures;' 3 (3) safeguard measures; 14 (4) the so-called "New Trade Policy

Instrument" (NTPI); 15 and (5) measures against unfair pricing practices
in maritime transport. 6 Two of these measures do not concern imports
in the EEC. The NTPI is aimed primarily at protecting access by
EEC firms to third country markets. The purpose of measures against
unfair pricing in maritime transport speaks for itself. Therefore, these
measures will not be discussed further.
Among these trade protection measures, anti-dumping measures
are of special importance. First, they are frequently used. In the
period of 1977 through 1984, no less than 301 anti-dumping proceedings
were initiated, and protective measures were taken in 226 cases. 17 By
contrast, only six anti-subsidy proceedings were initiated in this
period., Safeguard measures have also been taken less frequently, at
an average of only two per year. 19 In fact, some experts consider
common obstacles facing
anti-dumping measures to be one of the 2most
0
non-agricultural exporters to the EEC.

Second, anti-dumping measures are discriminatory. By contrast,
safeguard measures work through the imposition of quotas, which are,
in theory at least, non-discriminatory.21 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures can be tailored not only to a specific country, but even
to a specific firm. Third, anti-dumping measures are aimed against
the unfair trade practices of private parties. This contrasts the countervailing measures aimed at subsidies such as government actions,
and safeguards measures aimed at exports in general.
3. Reasons For and Against Anti-Dumping Legislation
Generally speaking, dumping is the sale of an imported product at
an abnormal, unreasonably low price. Determining when a given price
for a given product is unreasonably low is one of the most important
issues in anti-dumping law.

13. Id.
14. See EEC Reg. 288/82 (O.J. 1982, L35/1); EEC Reg. 1765/82 (O.J. 1982, L195/1); EEC
Reg. 1766/82 (O.J. 1982, L195/21).
15. See EEC Reg. 2641/84 (O.J. 1984, L252/1).
16. See EEC Reg. 4056/86 (O.J. 1986, L378/14).
17. I. VAN BAEL & J. BELLIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12-13 (1985).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Compare arts. XIII and XIX of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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From the point of view of a dumping firm, selling at unreasonably
low prices may make sense for a variety of reasons, that may be
divided into two groups. First, "firm-oriented" reasons related to circumstances within the firm. For instance, the dumping firm may simply want to get rid of old stock, or of excess supply due to a decrease
in demand. Second, "market-oriented" reasons related to the firm's
position on the foreign market. A firm may be willing to accept initial
low profits or even losses in order to gain a foothold in the market,
to increase its market share, or drive out its competitors.
It is the market-oriented group that creates the need for anti-dumping legislation. Two different lines of reasoning can be distinguished.
First, "pro-competitive" reasoning is based on parallels between dumping and the so-called "predatory pricing" or "cut-throat" competition.
This is the practice of eliminating competitors by deliberately starting a
price war. It is seen as anti-competitive, and consequently is prohibited
by many competition laws. 2 Following this line of reasoning, dumping
in international trade is the equivalent of cut-throat competition in
domestic trade, and must be combated to maintain free competition.
This argument is widely used but is rather suspect. Economic research
seems to point out that predatory pricing in international trade is
actually very rare.2 Moreover, if dumping is only a form of anti-competitive conduct, one might ask why specialized anti-dumping legislation is needed instead of competition legislation.
Second, "simple protectionist" reasoning is based on the theory
that few governments will be willing to stand aside while their industries are being injured by cheap foreign imports. As a method of
protection, anti-dumping measures offer several advantages. They are
highly selective, and can be aimed at a specific country or a specific
firm. They are seen as a legitimate form of defense, and thus they
can avoid some of the stigma attached to other forms of protectionism.
Notwithstanding these reasons, anti-dumping legislation can be
easily abused as a device for plain protectionism. Any industry injured
by imported goods is usually quick to complain about unfair competition
and to demand protection through anti-dumping measures. However,
if anti-dumping laws were to satisfy all such demands, it would become
an instrument of protectionism, and a serious hindrance to international trade.

22.

See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.

23. See Stegemann, Anti-Dumping Policy and the Consumer, J.

WORLD TRADE L.

466-67

(1985).
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4. GATT Legislation
The threat of anti-dumping provisions being used as protective
devices against foreign imports materialized during the great economic
crisis of the interbellum. The problem had already been recognized at
the time, and the League of Nations investigated the problem.After the Second World War, the issue of dumping and the abuse
of anti-dumping provisions was raised again during the negotiations
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 25 As a result,
the first international rules on dumping were incorporated in the GATT
in 1948.26 These have subsequently been worked out in two "AntiDumping Codes." The first was created in 1967 as a result of the
Kennedy Round of negotiations in 1967.27 The second was created in
1979 after the Tokyo Round of negotiations. 28
5.

Community Legislation

The first anti-dumping legislation in the EEC 29 entered into force
in 1969, about seven months after the first GATT Anti-Dumping Code.

The original Commission proposal was modified to take the GATT
Code provisions into account. It was amended a number of times as
experience was gained and new problems were encountered. A major
review of EEC anti-dumping legislation took place in 1980.30 The aim

of this review was mainly to take into account the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations: the 1979 GATT Anti-Dumping Code. This regulation was replaced in 1984,'31 and was later modified by the "Screwdriver
Regulation '' 32 aimed at preventing evasion of anti-dumping measures

by assembling imported components in the EEC. Finally, a new regulation was adopted in 1988-3 to unify all anti-dumping legislation in
a single text (1988 Regulation). This regulation also introduced certain
measures to enhance the effectiveness of anti-dumping duties.- 4 This
regulation is currently in force.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
GATT
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See J. VINER, A MEMORANDUM ON DUMPING (1966).
GAT r, supra note 21.
Id. art. VI.
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 15 GATT Supp., at 24.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (O.J. 1980, L71/72) [hereinafter
1979 Anti-Dumping Code].
EEC Reg. 459/68 (O.J. 1968, L93/1).
EEC Reg. 3017/79 (O.J. 1979, L339/1).
EEC Reg. 2176/84 (O.J. 1984, L201/1).
EEC Reg. 1761/87 (O.J. 1987, L167/9).
Appendix 1, supra note 12.
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The fact that new EEC legislation tended to follow new GATT
legislation suggests that GATT rules influenced EEC law. In fact, the
current EEC legislation is modeled after the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code,
although the amendments of 1987 and 1988 have no counterpart in
the GATT Code. The influence of the GATT rules on EEC anti-dumping law is further illustrated by the fact that the current GATT-based
Regulation is also used against imports from states that are not GATT
members.
C.

Substantive Anti-Dumping Law in the EEC
1. The Three-Criteria System

According to the 1988 Regulation, anti-dumping protective meas3
ures are not justified by the mere existence of low-priced imports. 5
Three conditions must be fulfilled before anti-dumping measures can
be taken: (1) there must be dumping;36 (2) there must be injury caused
by the dumping to an established Community industry;37 and (3) taking
measures must be in the interests of the EEC.3 Each of the three
criteria will be discussed separately.
2.

First Condition: Dumping

The existence of dumping as a condition for the application of
anti-dumping measures is obvious. Dumping is defined in article 2(2),
and appropriately named "PRINCIPLE. ' ' 39 It gives the following definition of a dumped product: "A product shall be considered to have
been dumped if its export price to the Community is less than the
'
normal value of the like product. 40
According to article 2(8), the export price is the price actually paid
for the product in the Community.41 It is, in other words, the EEC
price. The value of a product is normally its domestic price or the
price on the market of the country of origin.42 Put simply, a product
is dumped when it is sold in the EEC at a lower price than in its
country of origin.

34. See part I, § C(5).
35. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 2.
36. Id. art. 2(1).
37. Id.
38. Id. arts. 11(1) and 12(1).
39. Id. art. 2(2).
40. Id. (following GAT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 2(1)).
41. Id. art. 2(8).
42. Id. art. 2(3)(a).
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The amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price
is called the "dumping margin."- This is an indication of how serious
the dumping is. The dumping margin also serves as an upper limit to
the anti-dumping measures.
This simple rule gives way to a bewildering variety of alternatives
in practice. Article 2, which lays down detailed rules for the determination of the normal value, lists three special occasions on which alternatives to the rule given above are used.- These are all derived from
the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 45 The first of these special occasions
is when the product is not sold on the domestic market at all, or when
its price is not a proper indication of its value. 46 This may be the case
when the domestic market is closed for international competition, when
there is a monopoly, or when the domestic prices are government-determined or subsidized. The second special occasion is if the product
is systematically sold on its domestic market at a price below production costs. 47 The third occasion is if the product originates in a non-market economy, so that its domestic price is determined by considerations
different from those in a market economy and cannot be used.4
In these cases, a variety of alternatives may be used instead of
the domestic market price: (1) a suitably modified actual price to
compensate for sales below cost price; (2) the market price in a representative third or "reference country; ' ' 49 (3) the constructed value, a
price calculated by adding the costs of raw materials, labor, depreciation, transport, and reasonable profit margin measured at the price
level of the country of origin; ° or (4) the price of a like product in
the Community. Where more than one alternative pricing technique
can be used, there is no special hierarchic order: the Commission may
use its discretion to choose a particular alternative.
Other exceptions apply to both the normal value and the export
price. Article 2 covers cases in which exporter and importer manipulate
prices by mutual consent to hide dumping or to evade taxes. 51 This is

43. Id. art. 2(14)(a).
44. Id. art. 2(3)-2(6).
45. Cf. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 2(4).
46. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 2(3)(b).
47. Id. art. 2(4).
48. Id. at art 2(5); I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 12 (note that some 45% of all
anti-dumping proceedings between 1970 and 1984 involved non-market economies).
49. This is often used for imports from non-market economies.
50. This is not the case for non-market economies where the domestic prices of raw materials, labour, etc. suffer from the same defect as the domestic price of the product itself and
the prices in a reference country are used instead.
51. Appendix 1, supra note 12, arts. 2(7) and 2(8)(b).
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known as transfer pricing. In some cases, the Commission may even
use its discretion to establish an export price on "any reasonable
basis."52
After the normal value and the export price are determined, they
must be compared with each other to establish the size of the dumping
margin, if there is one. If more exporters and importers, or if several
closely related products are involved, the Commission may use various
averaging and sampling techniques.- In this way, a more or less
generalized dumping margin may be established. There are also some
provisions that ensure proper care is taken with differences in quality,
quantity, terms of sale, time of the year, relevant taxes and import
duties.3.

Second Condition: Injury

The purpose of EEC anti-dumping legislation is not to prevent or
punish dumping, but to protect Community industries from being
harmed. Consequently, protective action is not allowed in cases where
dumping does not cause injury to Community industries. This is the
background of the "injury criterium," which is prescribed by the GATT
Code.- 5 The 1988 Regulation recognizes three types of injury: (1) actual
injury which has already been suffered; (2) the threat of future injury;
and (3) material retardation of the development of an industry.- This
was probably included in the GATT Code for the benefit of developing
nations. 57 It has been faithfully copied in Community legislation, but
5
has never been used as basis for finding injuries.M
Article 4 of the 1988 Regulation also describes various methods to
determine injury, such as looking at quantitative increases in imports,
decreases in prices, and trends in the Community industry. 59 An investigation into a threat of injury follows more or less the same methods.
Some of these include extrapolating imported quantities, prices, and
growing production capacity in the country of origin.
Injury is normally measured in terms of harm to the industry of
the EEC as a whole. However, when a particular region forms a

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. art. 2(8)(b).
Id. art. 2(13).
Id. art. 2(9)-2(11); cf. GATT 1967 Anti-Dumping Code art. 2(b).
GAIT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 3.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 4(1).
Cf. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 13.

58.

J.

BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY

165 (1986); I. BAEL & J.
59. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 4.

PEAN COMMUNITIES

BELLIS,
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separate sub-market with regard to a particular product, injury to
the producers in that region is measured. 6° A region constitutes a
separate sub-market when there is no trade in that product between
the region and the rest of the EEC.
4.

Third Condition: Community Interest

The criterium of Community interest is also an elaboration of a
principle from the GATT Code that protective measures are never
obligatory: they are left to the discretion of the competent authorities.
Concretely, this means that the EEC authorities may at all times
refrain from taking measures when they judge it in the interest of
the Community.
Note that Community interest does not have to be proven: if dumping and injury exist, it is assumed to be in the interest of the Community to take protective measures, unless some special reasons exist.
In the past, the following reasons have been given for not taking
protective measures: (1) because the benefit of protective measures
to Community producers was outweighed by the detriment that measures would cause to Community industries that used the product as
raw material;61 (2) because measures would be unnecessary, such as
when the dumping was likely to stop without them;62 (3) because measures would be ineffective, or not help the injured parties. 63 Reasons
that have not been used in the past but may be used in the future
include the foreign policy interests of the Community and the interests
of the consuming public.
5. Protective Measures
The standard protective measures in EEC anti-dumping law are
anti-dumping duties collected in the same way as import duties. They
are only "standard" in the sense that they are considered to be ordinary
measures while undertakings are considered to be deviations. In practice, undertakings are by far the most frequently used protective
measures. In the period 1983-1985, 58 procedures were concluded by
undertakings and only 33 by duties.- 4

60.
61.
62.

Id. art. 4(5).
See, e.g., Wrought Titanium Case (Japan), Notice of Termination (O.J. 1979, C207/4).
See, e.g., Aluminium Case (Norway and others), EEC Comm'n Decision 84/103 (O.J.

1984, L110/19).

63. See, e.g., Codeine Case (E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 83/9 (O.J. 1983, L16/30).
64. Fourth Commission Report to the European Parliament on the Anti-Dumping and AntiSubsidy measures of the European Community, COM (87) 178 final, at 10 [hereinafter Fourth
Report].
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There are two types of anti-dumping duties under EEC law. The
first are definitive duties imposed only at the end of an investigation.
While they are in force, the product is released from the customs area
only upon payment of the duties. They have to be proportional to the
seriousness of the dumping and the injury: they may not be higher
than necessary to eliminate the dumping margin or the injury.6 The
maximum duration is five years, after which they must be reviewed. 66
The second are provisional duties that can be imposed during an antidumping investigation. They are meant as interim measures preventing evasion of protective measures by dumping during short intermittent periods. While they are in force, the product concerned is released
from the customs area only if a bank security is provided for the
amount of the duties. They have a maximum duration of four months,
but can be extended for two months.67 Both definitive and provisional
duties are paid by the importer like ordinary import duties.
Definitive duties can have a retroactive effect referring back to
the date on which a provisional duty was imposed. In such a case,
collecting the definitive duty includes collecting the bank security for
the provisional duty. Partial collection, when the definitive duty is
lower than the provisional one, is also possible. 8
Duties with a retroactive effect before the imposition of provisional
duties are normally not allowed. However, there are four exceptions,
all of which have a certain punitive character: (1) if there has been a
case of intermittent dumping; (2) if there has been a history of dumping
causing injury; (3) if the importer was, or should have been, aware
that the exporter dumped and caused injury; and (4) if a previously
existing undertaking was broken.69
Since the adoption of the "Screwdriver Regulation, ' ' 70 anti-dumping
duties can be imposed on products assembled in the EEC from foreign
components. This Regulation, now article 13 of the 1988 Regulation,
lists three cumulative conditions for the imposition of "screwdriver
duties:" (1) the producer must be related to or associated with a
foreign producer whose products are already subject to an anti-dumping duty; (2) the assembling must have started or increased significantly after the imposition of the duty; and (3) more the 50% of the
components by value must be imported from the country whose prod-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 13(3).
Id. art. 15(1).
Id. art. 11(5).
Id. art. 12(2)(a).
Id. art. 13(4). The fourth exception will be further discussed in part II.
See supra note-32 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

13

INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. LAW
4, Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1989], Art. 3

[Vol. 4

ucts are subjected to the anti-dumping duty.71 Note that the components do not have to be made by the firm who is subjected to the
duty. It is sufficient if they originate in that firm's country. The
amount of the "screwdriver duties" must be proportional to the percentage of imported components.
A further refinement of the EEC's anti-dumping duty system was
recently introduced. It addressed a major drawback of anti-dumping
duties: they do not actually stop or prevent dumping. The dumping
firm can always choose to pay the duties and absorb the losses rather
than to lose part of the market share. Indeed, experience showed that
dumping firms often compensated their importers who had to pay
duties.
This problem is solved by article 13(11), which enables additional
anti-dumping duties to be imposed when the existing duties are borne
by the exporter. 72 This is supposed to be the case when the imposition
of the existing duty has not led the importer to increase his price
correspondingly, and when the importer cannot show that this is due
to reductions in his costs or profit margins. This provision was introduced very recently and has not yet been used. Potentially, it can
greatly increase the effectiveness of anti-dumping duties, but it could
also lead to a de facto minimum price for imported goods set by the
73
Community.
D.

EEC Anti-Dumping ProceduralLaw
1. Community Institutions

The Community institution most involved in anti-dumping proceedings is the Commission. The Commission enjoys nearly complete autonomy in anti-dumping matters. The role played by the Council and
the Advisory Committee is very limited.
The role of the Council is limited to the formal imposition of definitive duties. However, it can also overturn certain findings of the
74
Commission.
The Advisory Committee is made up of representatives of member
states. 75 Its function is to act as a forum for consultation of member
states by the Commission. A Committee member, or member state,
can demand that some decisions be made by the Council instead of
71. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 13.
72. Id. art. 13(11).
73. EEC Reg. 1761/87 (O.J. 1987, L169/9).
74. The term "finding" is used to mean any formal decision or determination in an anti-dumping procedure; cf. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 6 n.12.
75. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 6(1).
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by the Commission, and it can request that the Council overturn
certain decisions of the Commission. In addition, a number of trade
prescribe a consultation
treaties between the EEC and third countries
76
procedure involving non-member states.
2.

Initiation of Proceedings: Complaints

An anti-dumping proceeding may begin in two ways, only one of
which is normally used: (1) by a communication to the Commission
from a member state;- or (2) by a complaint to the Commission from
a natural or legal person on behalf of a Community industry7 s
The first way is rare: only one procedure has been initiated by a
member state.7 9 A complaint is the common way in which an anti-dumping proceeding is started. It is not entirely clear whether the Commission can initiate proceedings without a complaint. Article 7(1) states
that the Commission can initiate a proceeding when there is "sufficient
evidence," and does not mention complaints2o On the other hand,
article 7(1)(b) seems to suppose that every proceeding has a complainant.81
Any person submitting a complaint bears the burden of proving
that the person is "acting on behalf of a Community industry. '"- In
practice, this is interpreted by the Commission as representing some
25% of the Community production. 3 Most complainants are trade associations, but if a single firm is large enough it can represent a
sufficient part of a Community industry by itself.There is no heavy burden of proof on the complainant. All the
person must do is supply sufficient evidence to enable the Commission
to decide whether a formal anti-dumping investigation is desirable.
The Commission is willing to help formulate complaints and has made
a questionnaire for this purpose, which is available on request.8 Several large European trade87 organizations have done the same for the
benefit of their members.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See, e.g., Wooden Clogs Case (Sweden), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/21 (O.J. 1986, L32/28).
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 5(6).
Id. art. 5(1).
Tube & Pipe Fittings Case (Spain), EEC Comm'n Decision 83/3271 (O.J. 1983, L322/13).
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(1).
Id. art. 7(1)(b).
Id. art. 5(1).
I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 106 n.7.
Id. at 106.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 5(2).
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 180.
I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 14.
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If a complaint is withdrawn the proceeding is normally terminated,
unless the Commission decides that termination is contrary to the
interests of the Community."' This is logical, given the Commission's
ability to initiate proceedings on its own initiative, but it is rarely
done.3.

Preliminary Examination

The examination of a complaint by the Commission is called the
preliminary investigation. It requires consultation of the Advisory
Committee. 9° It serves to91separate the serious, well-founded complaints
from the frivolous ones.
If the Commission sees no reason to initiate a proceeding, the
complaint is declared inadmissible, and the complainant is so informed. 9 There is no formal rejection, and the complainant may improve the complaint-and try again. Some complaints go through several
rounds of discussions before being declared admissible.93
If, on the other hand, the Commission decides that the complaint
offers prima facie evidence of dumping and injury, a formal investigation will be started. The investigation is the phase of the proceeding
in which the Commission formally examines the existence of dumping
and injury. An investigation is started by the publication of a notice
of initiation in the Official Journal. Individual notifications have to be
sent to the exporters and importers concerned, to the representatives
of the country of origin, and to the complainant.The notice of initiation determines the product and the scope of
an investigation. The Commission may limit itself to part of the complaint for reasons such as procedural economy. It may also extend the
scope of the investigation to other products or exporters, as a result
of a supplementary complaint, 95 or because of its own suspicions.
4. Conduct of Investigations
Due to the specialized and confidential nature of much of the information relevant to anti-dumping investigations, it is nearly impossible

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Appendix 1,
J. BESELER
Appendix 1,
J. BESELER
Appendix 1,
J. BESELER
Appendix 1,
I. BAEL &

supra note 12, art. 5(4).
& A. WILLIAMS, supra note
supra note 12, art. 7(1).
& A. WILLIAMS, supra note
supra note 12, art. 5(5).
& A. WILLIAMS, supra note
supra note 12, art. 7(1)(b).
J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at
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for the Commission to conduct an investigation by itself. Instead, it
is forced to rely heavily on information provided by the complainants,
the exporters and importers, and other interested parties. One of the
purposes of the notice in the Official Journal is to draw the attention
of interested parties such as Community producers and trade organizations. It also prescribes a period in which they may make their
views known.The Commission may request the parties to the investigation to
have their offices visited by Commission officials, in order to collect
additional information and/or to verify information already in possession of the Commission.- The Commission cannot force a party to
allow this kind of search or to hand over particular documents.
This stands in marked contrast with the Commission's powers of
investigation in competition cases. 98 However, if a party refuses to
cooperate, the Commission may take a decision "on the basis of the
facts available. '" In the past, this has repeatedly meant on the basis
of information least favorable to the refusing party.-° Thus, most
parties adopt a more cooperative attitude.
If the visited offices are located in a third country, the prior approval of that state is necessary. This obligation flows directly from
the international law principle that enforcement jurisdiction is an integral part of a state's sovereignty.1° 1 However, making a decision based
on available facts when a party refuses to cooperate may also be used
in case of non-cooperation by states.10 2
If the offices are located within the Community territory, approval
is not necessary. The member states are required to tolerate visits
because of the loyalty obligation of article 5 of the EEC Treaty.103
The Commission can also request the member states to supply certain
information, or to conduct investigations.- °4 The Commission seems to
be reluctant to do so since only the control of customs invoices is
regularly requested. 105

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
Acrylic
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(a).
Id. art. 7(2).
See EEC Reg. 17/62 arts. 11, 14 & 15.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(7)(b).
I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 111; cf., The Commission's remarks in the
Fibers Case (U.S.A.), EEC Comm'n Decision 84/2275 (O.J. 1984, L209/1).
See Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(b).
See id. art. 7(7)(b).
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(5).
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 192.
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5. Confidentiality of Information
All information gathered during the investigation is open to inspection by certain interested parties.'0 6 They have the right to see the
Commission's files containing the collected information. This is an important procedural right, and the Commission's failure to observe it
may lead to annulment of a subsequent anti-dumping measure.10 7 These
"certain parties" are: the complainant, exporters and importers known
to be concerned, and representatives of the exporting countries. Other
interested parties, even if they have contributed information to the
file, are not included. However, the Commission can open its files to
other parties at its own discretion. °8 Internal documents of the Commission or of member states and confidential information are not included within the Commission's discretion to open information.
As mentioned above, much of the relevant information in an antidumping investigation is supplied by the parties. This private business
information can be confidential, such as details of production costs or
rebates given to particular customers. The parties in a proceeding
may therefore face the dilemma of either disclosing their secrets to
their competitors or losing the argument. Moreover, interested third
parties are unlikely to cooperate with the Commission by supplying
their own information without adequate guarantees of confidentiality.
Consequently, EEC anti-dumping procedure has provisions for confidential treatment. "Confidential" is ordinarily defined as "likely to
have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the source"
when disclosed. 09 A party can request confidential status for particular
information, accompanied by either a non-confidential summary or, if
this cannot be given, by proper motivation.11o If the Commission refuses confidential treatment, the supplier may withdraw the information.-1 If the Commission accepts, the information is considered confidential and is no longer open to other parties. Confidential information cannot be used as a basis for a decision, but the Commission may

106. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(4)(a).
107. Timex Corp. v. Commission of the EC, 1985 ECR 861, case 264/82.
108. See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 193 (a similar system is used
in the United States); E. VERMULST, Dumping in the US and the EC: A Comparative
Analysis in LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 103 (1984).
109. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 8(3) (there may be instances where disclosure could
harm someone else, such as a customer).
110. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
111. A similar system exists in Canada; See the Canadian Special Import Measures Act
arts. 79, 85(1) and 87(1).
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formulate non-confidential summaries or extracts and use these instead.112

Under no circumstances may any information submitted to the
Commission, confidential or not, be used for purposes other than for
as for a competition procedure against
which it was requested, such
3
the supplier or the source."1

6. Imposition of Provisional Duties
During the investigation, it may be necessary to take provisional
measures in order to discourage dumping during the investigation.
Provisional duties can be imposed when, after preliminary examination, the three conditions for taking measures seem to be fulfilled.
In actual practice, there is a strong tendency for provisional duties
to be taken in anticipation of definitive ones. The Commission tends
to impose provisional duties during all investigations not only when
the threat of dumping is particularly acute, unless an undertaking is
accepted.14 Furthermore, they tend to be imposed rather late: only
after on-the-spot verification."1 5 They are, on average, imposed after
eight months, while the average duration of an anti-dumping investigation is 9.3 months. 1 6 Consequently, definitive duties are often the
same as the preceding provisional ones.
Despite this, provisional duties are interim measures that may
have to be taken quickly. Consequently, the decisionmaking method
is designed for quick action. Provisional duties are imposed by a Commission Regulation either on the Commission's own initiative or at
the request of a member-state. 117 If such a request is received, the
Commission must make a decision within five days."18 Normally, measures are taken only after consulting with the Advisory Committee.
In especially urgent cases, the Commission may proceed after notifying
the member-states, and consultation must take place within ten days
of the decision. A Commission Decision imposing provisional duties
can be overturned by the Council acting through a qualified majority." 9

112. See E. VERMULST, supra note 108, at 121 (compare this with the United States'
system of partial disclosure under a protective order).
113. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 8(1).
114. Fourth Report, supra note 64, at 4 (earlier Annual Reports contain similar statements).
115. One reason is the limited duration of provisional duties.
116. Fourth Report, supra note 64, at 8.
117. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 11(1).
118. Id. art. 11(3).
119. Id. art. 12(4).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

19

FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Florida Journal of
International
Law, Vol. 4,
Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1989], Art. 3

[Vol. 4

7. Conclusion by Imposition of Definitive Duties
After a full anti-dumping investigation, if the three conditions of
dumping, injury, and EEC interest appear to be fulfilled, definitive
duties can be imposed.
Definitive duties are imposed by a Regulation of the Council acting through a qualified majority on a proposal
submitted by the Commission.12° The Commission must consult the
Advisory Committee when drawing up its proposal. It is very rare
for the Council to overturn a proposal of the Commission.121
If definitive duties are imposed, the investigation is concluded, but
the proceeding continues until the duties expire or are reviewed. Without review, duties expire, if imposed for a specific period, after that
period. When no specific period is fixed, duties expire automatically
after five years, the so-called "sunset period."'122
8.

Conclusion Without Imposition of Duties
Apart from imposing definitive duties, concluding an investigation
may be done by termination or by acceptance of an undertaking.
Conclusion by acceptance is discussed in part 11.123
Termination is a finding by the Commission that there are no
reasons to take protective measures. For example, when there is no
dumping and/or injury, or when the interests of the Community militate against protective measures. An investigation is terminated by
a Commission Decision, unless a member state objects during the
obligatory consultation of the Advisory Committee. In that case, the
Commission will send a proposal to the Council. This will be deemed
to be accepted unless the Council decides otherwise within one
month. 12?4Referrals to the Council are exceptional since the Committee
rarely objects.' 2 If an investigation is concluded by termination, the
anti-dumping proceeding is concluded automatically as well, and
a notice of termination is published in the Official Journal.126
9.

Review Procedure

An investigation that has been concluded can be re-opened by the
Commission on its own initiative at the request of a member state,

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
note 17,
126.

Id. art. 12(1).
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 223.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 15(1).
Seept. II, §§ D & E.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 9(1).
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 223; I.
at 117.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 9(1)-9(2).
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or at the request of an interested party. An interested party must
bring forward sufficient evidence to justify review. 12 This request for
review will be further discussed in part II.1?
E.

Judicial Review of Anti-Dumping Findings
1. General Remarks

In contrast to EEC competition law,,- no special legal regime
exists for the judicial review of anti-dumping findings. Therefore, antidumping findings of the Council and the Commission must be reviewed
under the normal EEC Treaty provisions for judicial review of acts
of Community institutions. Generally speaking, there are two ways
to challenge the outcome of an anti-dumping proceeding: (1) the action
for annulment of article 173 of the EEC Treaty, 130 and (2) the preliminary ruling cited in article 177 of the EEC Treaty. 131 However, actions
for annulment have admissibility problems, while preliminary rulings
have availability problems.
Theoretically, a third possibility exists: the action for damages
cited in article 215 of the EEC Treaty.'- The action for damages has
a purpose different from the other two challenges. It is aimed at
compensation for damages resulting from acts of the Community, while
the action for annulment'- or a preliminary ruling'- are aimed at the
annulment of an action. Consequently, the action for damages cannot
be used against acts against which an action for annulment is possible.13 Since the action for annulment is widely available, the use of
the action for damages is limited. Since the action for damages has
never been used independently against anti-dumping findings,a3 it will
not be discussed further.
2.

The Action for Annulment

Admissibility has been the main source of problems with the action
for annulment. According to article 173(2), only individuals directly
127. Id. art. 14.
128. See pt. II, § H.
129. EEC Reg. 17/62 (O.J. 1962).
130. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173.
131. Id. art. 177; Schoeppenstedt v. Council, case 5/71.
132. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 215.
133. Schoeppenstedt v. Council, XVII ECR 975, case 5/71.
134. Merkur v. Commission, XIX ECR 1055, case 43/72.
135. See Schoeppenstedt v. Council, case 5/71, at 993 (note the opinion of the Advocate-General Roemer).
136. Nippon Seiko KK v. Council & Comm'n of the EC, 1979 ECR 1303, case 119/77 (the
action for damages was used together with the action for annulment).
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and individually affected by a Community act have access to the
Court. 37 A considerable amount of jurisprudence was required to pinpoint those who have been thus affected by a particular anti-dumping
finding and those who have not. The following overview is arranged
according to the different findings that conclude an anti-dumping investigation but which may nontheless be challenged: (1) a Commission
Decision that initiates a formal anti-dumping investigation, or that
refuses to do so; (2) a Commission Decision that terminates an investigation without imposition of duties; and (3) a Council Regulation that
imposes definitive duties.
3.

Decision Not to Investigate

The first and quickest way to end an anti-dumping procedure is
when the Commission rejects the complaint during the preliminary
examination. In such a case, the procedure is over almost before it
starts.
The complainant might want to challenge such a decision, and clear
precedent exists in support of such a challenge. In the FEDIOL case,
the Court declared admissible an appeal of an association of oil processors against a Commission decision not to investigate the alleged dumping of soya oil-cake from Brazil. 13 The Court noted that the anti-dumping Regulation gives complainants certain specific rights: the right to
complain and to submit evidence, the right to be heard, the right to
have their complaint examined with due care, and the right to be
informed if the complaint is not pursued. 139 These rights cause the
complainant to be directly and individually affected by a decision not
to investigate and give him the right to challenge it before the Court.
However, no right of appeal exists in the opposite case: one cannot
challenge a finding that initiates an investigation. This can be inferred
from the IBM case. 140 In that case, the applicant challenged the Commission's finding to initiate an investigation as a possible violation of
article 85 of the EEC Treaty.14 The Court cited the principle that one
can challenge only measures that specifically state the position of the
Commission or the Council, and not provisional measures intended to

137. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173(2).
138. Federation de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v. Commission of the EC,
1983 ECR 2913, case 19/82
28 [hereinafter FEDIOL Case] (this was an anti-subsidy case.
However, the complaint system for anti-subsidy cases is the same as anti-dumping cases. Consequently, it is a valid precedent).
139. Id.
140. IBM v. Commission of the EC, 1981 ECR 2639, case 60/81.
141. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85.
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pave the way for a final decision. The finding to initiate a proceeding
did not affect the applicants' legal position, and any procedural irregularities could be challenged in an action against the final outcome
of the procedure. Consequently, the Court concluded that the initiation
could not be considered a decision within the meaning of article 173
142
of the EEC Treaty, and could not be challenged.
4.

Termination Without Measures

The second way in which a proceeding might end is when the
Commission decides that there is no dumping, no injury, or no Community interest in taking measures. Only the complainant would have
any interest in challenging this decision. Although this has never been
done, it is inconceivable that the complainant would not have the right
to do so.
First, all arguments used in FEDIOL to justify the complainant's
right of appeal against a Commission decision not to pursue a complaint
also apply to the Commission's final decision. Second, in the Timex
case 4 3 the Court held that a complainant may challenge the imposition
of a definitive duty that he considers too low. Therefore, it would be
illogical to deny the complainant an appeal against a decision that
imposes no duty at all.
5.

Imposition of Definitive Duties

A Council Regulation that imposes a definitive duty is somewhat
special since it is the only finding that all parties may want to challenge:
the producers/exporters and importers because they consider it too
high, and the complainant because he considers it too low. The last
case, that of a complainant challenging a Regulation imposing definitive
duties, was decided by the Court in the Timex case.'" Expressly using
the same reasoning as in FEDIOL, the Court recognized the complainant's right to challenge a definitive duty considered too low. However,
there was a trap in this case: the Court took account of the fact that
Timex played a very active role during the investigation, and that the
determination of injury.was based largely on Timex's position. Without
these circumstances, e.g. when a complainant submits a complaint and
is never heard of again, the outcome might have been different.
Producers/exporters who want to challenge a Regulation imposing
definitive duties face a particular problem. On the one hand, a regu-

142.
143.
144.

Id. art 173.
Timex Corp. v. Commission of the EC, 1985 ECR 861, case 264/82.
Id.
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lation imposing a duty is general in the sense that it applies to all
imports of a certain product. In such a case, nobody is individually
concerned. On the other hand, it may also single out particular producers/exporters, who are individually concerned as a result. In the Allied
Corporation Case,145 the Court recognized two ways in which producers
and exporters can be singled out: "[i]t follows that the acts imposing
anti-dumping duties are of such a nature that they concern directly
and individually those producers and exporters who are able to show
that they have been identified in the decisions of the Commission or
the Council or concerned by the preparatory investigation. "146 In other
words, a producer/exporter can be directly and individually affected
both by being named in the regulation, and by playing a role in the
investigation.
An importer who is associated in some way to a producer/exporter
can profit from this connection and can claim direct and individual
concern as well. This approach was followed by the Court in the
Japanese Ballbearings Case,14 7 in which the affiliates derived direct
and individual effect from the link with their parents.
However, an independent importer is never directly and individually affected, unless he is expressly named in the decision. This flows
directly from the Court's decision in the Alusuisse Case.' 48 In that
case the Court held:
Such measures constitute, as regards independent importers
who, in contrast to exporters, are not expressly named in
the regulations, measures having general application within
the meaning of the second paragraph of article 189 of the
Treaty, because they apply to objectively determined situations and entail legal effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the abstract. 149
This limitation of the rights of independent importers has been
criticized.150 However, importers are assured judicial review by way
of a preliminary ruling.

145. Allied Corp. v. Commission of the EC, 1984 ECR 1005, cases 239 & 272/82.
146. Id.
11-12.
147. Nippon Seiko KK v. Council & Comm'n of the EC, 1979 ECR 1303, case 119/77, 14-15.
148. Alusuisse Italia SpA v. Council & Comm'n of the EC, 1982 ECR 8463, case 307/81.
149. Id.
9.
150. Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-Dumping and Anti Subsidy Determinationsafter
FEDIOL: The Emergency of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 539, 550
(1984) (Bellis has pleaded for criteria more like that for exporters in Allied Corp.).
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6.

Preliminary Rulings

Preliminary rulings as a method of access to the Court are only
to importers protesting duties. Only in this case can the parties in
anti-dumping decisions come into contact with a national judicial authority who can request a preliminary ruling. Since the importers
have to pay the duties to the national customs authorities, they can
request a preliminary question via the national judicial system for
customs affairs. This possibility was one of the considerations that led
the Court to deny admissibility in actions for annulment to independent
importers in the Alusuisse Case.15 1 Complainants and producers/exporters do not have recourse to preliminary rulings.152
7. Review Standard
All parties in an anti-dumping proceeding usually have access to
the Court in one way or another. However, this is somewhat counterbalanced by the fact that the Court seems to leave to the Commission
extremely wide discretion in conducting the proceedings. Given the
nature of the Commission's task, judging highly complex economic
matters, the Court is naturally reluctant to second-guess the Commission. Consequently, as illustrated by the Remia Case, 153 the Court
tends to limit its review to "verifying whether the relevant procedural
rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons
for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately
stated and whether there has been any manifest error or a misuse of
powers.",The Advocate-General gave similar exhaustive list of reasons for
annulment, in the Miniature Ballbearing Cases: (1) non-compliance
with procedural rules; (2) insufficiency of motivation; (3) material incorrectness of the facts; (4) manifest errors of judgment; and (5) misuse
of powers. 15
The Court recently reaffirmed its decision, referring explicitly to
the Remia Case:
It should be noted that the choice between the different
methods of calculation ... requires an appraisal of complex
151. Alusuisse Italia SpA v. Council & Comm'n of the EC, 1982 ECR 8463, $ 13; see also
15.
Allied Corp. v. Comm'n of the EC, 1984 ECR 1005, cases 239 & 275/82,
152. Unless they used an artificial legal construction such as was used in Foglia Novello,
1980 ECR 745, case 104/79; see also Foglia Novello, 1981 ECR 3045, case 244/80.
153. Remia v. Commission of the EC, case 42/84 (July 11, 1985 judgment not yet reported).
154. Id.
34.
155. Conclusions of the Advocate-General Mancini, presented to the Court 11 November
1986, in the Miniature Ballbearing Cases, infra note 302.
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economic situations. The Court must therefore . . . limit its
review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the relevant
procedural rules have been complied with, whether the facts
on which the choice is based have been accurately stated
and whether there has been a manifest error of appraisal or
a misuse of power.'156
It appears from these cases that the Court will only check that
the facts supporting the finding are correct ("exactitude materielle
des faits"). It will not annul a finding because a set of facts used,
although materially correct, gives a biased or misleading view of the
actual situation. However, if the Commission's acts are so outrageous
that they amount to a manifest error of judgment, the Court might
annul a finding. This is a serious shortcoming, because of the variety
of techniques available to prove the existence of dumping and injury.
An ill suited method can easily distort the outcome of an investigation,
even when using facts that are themselves correct.
F.

Summary of Part I

The main points of interest for undertakings flowing from the preceding discussion of anti-dumping law in general are:
(1) There are plenty of valid business reasons to engage in dumping, even in the course of normal, fair, competition; consequently,
anti-dumping law is not aimed at punishing dumping, but at preventing
the damage being caused by it.
(2) Anti-dumping law has a somewhat dual character: on one hand,
it promotes competition by preventing unfair forms of competition; on
the other, it reduces competition by shielding industries from foreign
competition.
(3) EEC anti-dumping law has always closely followed GATT antidumping rules; changes in GATT legislation have always been quickly
followed by changes in ECC law. This has lead to applying GATT
rules to non-GATT members.
J
(4) Anti-dumping duties in EEC law can only be imposed when
there is both dumping and injury resulting from the dumping. A wide
variety of techniques exist to prove the dumping and the injury. The
Court allows the Commission wide discretion to choose one or more
particular techniques.
(5) Anti-dumping duties do not actually prohibit or prevent dumping. Instead, they merely make it more expensive to do so. Since the

156. Nippon Seiko KK v. Council of the EC, case 258/84,
yet reported).
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adoption of the current Regulation, duties can be raised to the dumping
margin when they are borne by the exporter.
(6) The Commission enjoys near-complete autonomy in EEC antidumping procedures; the roles of the Council and the Advisory Committee are limited in practice.
(7) Any finding that ends an anti-dumping proceeding can be challenged before the Court. Generally speaking, those parties singled out
in the findings have access to the Court via the action for annulment,
and those who have to pay the duties via preliminary rulings.
(8) The right of complainants to challenge anti-dumping findings
depends mainly on the role they played during the investigation: if
they influenced the finding by actively participating, they can challenge.
III.

PART II: UNDERTAKINGS IN

A.

EEC

ANTI-DUMPING LAW

Introduction

While part I dealt with anti-dumping law in general, this part will
concentrate on undertakings in particular. It will describe the law and
practice of the European Community with regard to the use of undertakings in anti-dumping law. It is divided into seven, sections.
The first section will describe the general concept of undertakings:
that of an agreement between a firm and the Community which replaces normal protective duties. It will also describe the advantages
and disadvantages of undertakings, and their use in other forms of
EEC trade protection legislation.
The second section will describe the substantive law with regard
to anti-dumping undertakings as set out in the 1988 Regulation. This
paragraph can be subdivided into two parts. The first part describes
the contents of an undertaking covering both the legal requirements
to the contents of undertakings and the "typical" contents, i.e. the
clauses that normal undertakings tend to contain. The second part
describes the results of an undertaking, i.e. the changes in the legal
position of the Community and of the undertaking firms resulting from
undertakings.
The third section will describe the procedural law with regard to
undertakings. Like the section dealing with EEC Anti-Dumping Procedural Law in part I, section D, it is divided according to the different
phases of an anti-dumping undertaking: (1) the offering of undertakings, covering who may offer undertakings, and at what time during
the anti-dumping investigation undertakings may be offered; (2) the
acceptance of undertakings, and subsequent termination of the antidumping investigation; (3) the refusal of undertakings; and (4) the
termination of undertakings due to lapse, withdrawal, or review.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The fourth section will describe several aspects of the Commission's
practice with regard to accepting or refusing undertakings. This covers
five different issues: (1) the Commission's policy towards tacit undertakings, i.e. undertaking-like agreements between the Commission
and firms, concluded outside the normal procedural framework for
undertakings; (2) the Commission's policy towards undertakings offered by exporters other than those of the dumped product; (3) the
Commission's reasoning behind the acceptance of undertakings; (4) the
Commission's reasoning behind the refusal of undertakings; and (5) a
possible change of the Commission's policy towards undertakings in
1985.
The next two sections will describe two specific problems with
regard to undertakings. Section F will describe a particular type of
undertaking. As mentioned in the general introduction, undertakings
usually oblige a firm to maintain a certain minimum price. However,
quantitative undertakings contain limitations on the volume of imports
into the EEC. This section will discuss these quota undertakings.
Section G will describe the relation between undertakings and competition law. According to the conventional view, anti-dumping measures
are competition neutral. In other words, they do not influence the
competitive situation. This section will show that view cannot be sustained, and that competition law and anti-dumping undertakings influence each other.
Finally, section H will describe the possibilities for judicial review
of anti-dumping findings dealing with undertakings. Like the discussion of judicial review of anti-dumping findings in general in the preceding part, it will be split into a section on admissibility problems
and a section on the review standards used by the Court.
B.

The Concept of Undertakings

1. The Idea Behind Undertakings
As was shown in part I, the system of anti-dumping protective
duties has a somewhat confrontational character: a conflict between
the EEC industries and the Community on one hand, and the producers, exporters, and importers of the allegedly dumped product on the
other. This "conflict approach" to anti-dumping ultimately may not
satisfy anybody: the dumping firms because of the financial penalties,
and the EEC industries and the Community because they cannot be
sure that anti-dumping duties will actually stop the dumping.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs could be avoided by adopting a
more "consensual approach" to the problem. Instead of imposing
duties, the Community authorities could convince the exporters or
producers that they should raise their prices "voluntarily." With the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss2/3
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threat of duties in the background, this should not be too difficult.
The EEC authorities and industries could be sure that prices would
rise to the required level, and the dumping firm could escape financial
penalties.
This is the general idea behind anti-dumping undertakings. As
mentioned previously, undertakings are agreements between the
dumping firms and the EEC authorities. The firms agree to stop
dumping, i.e. to raise their prices, and in return are not subjected to
anti-dumping duties.
2. Similar Agreements in Other Forms of EEC Trade Protection
Similar agreements between exporters and the Commission are
widely used in other forms of EEC trade protection.
Countervailing or anti-subsidy measures are governed by the same
regulation as anti-dumping measures, and have the same provisions
as undertakings.17 However, since the offender in an anti-subsidy case
is not a firm but a state, an anti-subsidy undertaking is not concluded
with a private firm but with a state. As mentioned in part I, section
B, anti-subsidy cases are rather rare. As a result there has been only
one anti-subsidy undertaking. In a case involving women's shoes,
Brazil undertook to eliminate the effects of a subsidy program by
imposing an export tax. 15
Safeguard measures under the 1988 Regulation normally take the
form of quotas. The 1988 Regulation does not contain any explicit
reference to undertakings. However, the Commission accepted a voluntary export restraint agreement (VERA) in one case involving
stoneware. 15 9 This was an agreement with a state: the exporting country, South Korea, undertook to impose an export quota on exports to
the EEC. 16°
The New Trade Policy Instrument (NTPI) of the 1984 Regulation6l

does not envisage any concrete protective measures. Instead, it outlines a consultation procedure to investigate complaints. However,
with regard to agreements, article 9(a) of the NTPI states that the
procedure may be terminated if the third country against which the
procedure is used "take(s) measures which are considered satisfac-

157.
158.
159.
160.
to accept
L200/43).
161.

See Appendix 1, supra note 12.
(O.J. 1981, L327/39).
EEC Reg. 873/83 (O.J. 1983, L96/8).
Interestingly, the Federal Republic of Germany challenged the Commission's power
the VERA, but the Council confirmed the acceptance in EEC Reg. 2050/83 (O.J. 1983,
This disagreement has not led to proceedings before the Court.
EEC Reg. 2641/84 (O.J. 1984, L252/1).
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This could be used as the legal basis for an agreement, probably in the form of a VERA such as that in South Korea.
The regulation on unfair maritime pricing practices'O contains
explicit provisions on undertakings that generally resemble those of
the 1988 Regulation. These undertakings can be concluded both with
states and with shipping companies. Only a single measure has been
taken under this regulation, so an examination of the Commission's
practice with regard to undertakings is not possible.
tory."162

3.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Undertakings

If properly used, undertakings offer considerable advantages for
all parties involved: the undertaking firms, the industries that need
protection, and the EEC authorities that administer the anti-dumping
law of the Community. First, an undertaking does not constitute a
financial penalty. Instead of paying duties, the importers receive extra
revenues as a result of the higher prices, and this may
compensate for a possible decrease in the volume of sales. This advantage is the main incentive for dumping firms to offer undertakings.
Second, undertakings are an effective way to stop dumping. A
disadvantage of anti-dumping duties is that they may not have the
desired effect on the pricing policy of the dumping firm. It may, after
all, choose not to increase its prices and to absorb its losses rather
than lose its customers. By contrast, undertakings affect prices directly. This is an incentive for the EEC authorities and industries to
encourage the use of undertakings.
Third, undertakings provide a way to end an anti-dumping proceeding quickly and with a minimum of legal and administrative costs.
This argument will appeal to all parties concerned, but especially to
the Commission, since it bears the lion's share of the costs of an
investigation. However, this cost advantage in the investigation is
offset by the cost of monitoring possible violations of undertakings.
This point will be further discussed in part II, section E.
Unfortunately, these benefits come at a price. Undertakings have
disadvantages to the undertaking firms, the EEC authorities, and the
Community industries. First, an undertaking may be violated, i.e. its
obligations can be dodged. This does not necessarily mean that the
firm concluding the undertaking is deliberately cheating. It may mean
that the firm has insufficient control over its product and cannot prevent parallel imports or discounts by individual importers. This risk

162.
163.

Id. art. 9(a).
EEC Reg. 4056/86 (O.J. 1986, L378/14), art. 10.
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can be kept at a minimum by the following measures: (1) by allowing
quick replacement of violated undertakings by normal anti-dumping
duties, limiting the damages when they occur; (2) by a system of
penalties for firms that willfully violate their undertakings; (3) by
building a control system into the undertaking. The undertaking firm
can also be made to submit periodic reports on its compliance with
the provisions of the undertakings.
A second related disadvantage is that undertakings must be monitored to prevent violations. As mentioned above, an obligation to
submit periodic reports can be part of the undertaking, but the reports
still have to be verified. By contrast, an anti-dumping duty requires
no further attention once it has been imposed, since it is administered
by the national customs authorities.
Third, the provisions of the undertaking may become outdated by
inflation, changes in exchange rates, or market developments. This
risk can be minimized by the use of inflation or currency adjustment
systems, or by defining prices in basket currencies. Allowing periodic
reviews of the undertaking may also minimize the risk.
Fourth, undertakings limit the freedom of the undertaking firms
to lower their prices in response to their competitors' price cuts. This
problem is especially acute when competitors have actively participated in the anti-dumping investigation and have, as a consequence,
a fairly good idea of the minimum price. It would be unreasonable to
force a firm to stand by while its competitors take over its market
share. Moreover, few would be willing to offer undertakings under
such circumstances.
Therefore, undertakings ideally should have an "emergency exit:"
a way in which the firm can withdraw from the undertaking after
proper notification, without breaking it outright and incurring the
penalties for violation. Thus, assessing the advantages and disadvantages of undertakings demonstrates that in a properly designed undertaking, the advantages can be made to outweigh the disadvantages.
4. Use of Undertakings by the EEC
Undertakings are favorably looked upon by the EEC authorities.
The Commission has admitted that it often considers undertakings the
most flexible way to eliminate the injury caused by dumping.64 This
is reflected in the large number of investigations that are concluded
by the acceptance of undertakings. 16
164. Third Commission Report to the European Parliament on the Anti-Dumping and AntiSubsidy Measures of the European Community, COM (86) 308 final, at 4 [hereinafter Third
Report].
165. Fourth Report, supra note 64, at 2, table 1.
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TABLE 166
Imposition of Duties
Acceptance of Undertakings
Terminated for Other Reasons
Investigations Concluded

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

7
35
9
51

20
27
11
58

5
27
10
42

8
4
20
32

4
25
18
47

More than 50% of all investigations are concluded by undertakings,
and except for 1985, undertakings always outnumbered definitive

duties. 167
5. Undertakings and the GATT Anti-Dumping Rules
Part I illustrated the importance of the GATT anti-dumping rules
and their influence upon the EEC legislation. That influence extends
to the law concerning undertakings as well. The GATT Anti-Dumping
Code contains the following provisions on undertakings: (1) an undertaking does not have to consist of an obligation to raise prices; it can
also contain an obligation "to cease exports to the area in question at
dumped prices;"18 (2) the price increases under an undertaking may
not be higher than necessary to eliminate either the dumping or the
injury caused by it;169 (3) an undertaking cannot remain in force longer
than would be possible for an anti-dumping duty;170 (4) an undertaking
can only be accepted as part of a formal anti-dumping investigation;171
(5) an undertaking need not be accepted if the authorities consider it
impractical;7 2 (6) an undertaking may include an obligation for the
firm to submit periodic reports to the authorities;,7 3 (7) an undertaking
may not be forced upon a firm, but may be suggested; if a firm refuses
to offer an undertaking it may not be penalized;174 (8) if an undertaking
is broken, the authorities may impose provisional duties immediately;
subsequent definitive duties may have a retroactive effect for up to
90 days before the imposition of provisional duties. 175 All of these
166.
167.
§ E.
168.
169.
170.
171.
evidence
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Possible reasons for the sudden change of practice in 1984 are discussed in part II,
GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(1).
Id. (same limitation applies to anti-dumping duties in art. 8(3)).
Id. art. 7(6).
Id. art. 7(2) (under art. 5(1), initiation of such an investigation requires prima facie
of dumping or injury).
Id. art. 7(2).
Id. art. 7(5).
Id. art. 7(4).
Id. art. 7(5).
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provisions have been incorporated in the EEC anti-dumping legislation
currently in force, the 1988 Regulation.
C.

Substantive Law Concerning Undertakings
1. Legal Requirements to Undertakings

One of the most important issues with regard to undertakings is
the contents, the provisions required in an undertaking. The 1988
Regulation allows maximum freedom in this area. The only legal requirements of an undertaking are that the dumping firm must revise
its prices or cease its exports to the extent that the Commission is
satisfied that the dumping margin, or the injurious effects thereof,
are eliminated.176
Three observations follow from these requirements. First, an undertaking is similar to an anti-dumping duty in that it is supposed to
eliminate either the dumping or the injury. Like a duty, an undertaking
cannot be required to eliminate both. Since the purpose of an undertaking is to make a duty unnecessary, it is not surprising to see that
it is aimed at the same result. Second, there are two types of undertakings: one that leads to price increases and is called "price undertaking," and one that leads to quantitative limitations of exports and is
called "quantitative undertaking." Quantitative undertakings are
rarely used and doubts about their legality may arise. They will be
discussed further in section G of part II. For this section, assume
that undertakings are price undertakings, unless otherwise specified.
Third, the Commission has a very wide margin of discretion in accepting or refusing undertakings. The only criterium is that it must be
"satisfied" that the dumping or the injury is eliminated.177
2. Typical Contents of Undertakings
The actual contents of undertakings are confidential. They are
known only to the Commission and to the undertaking firms. However,
several authors have written from their experiences working for or
with the Commission providing a general picture.178
A typical undertaking is said to contain provisions on: (1) minimum
prices; (2) the period of application; (3) the supply of information; and
(4) evasion by firms other than the undertaking firm. The minimum

176. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
177. Compare this with the Court's interpretation of this margin of discretion in the Miniature Ballbearings Cases, see infra note 302 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra
note 58.
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price provisions are the heart of the undertaking. It is usually fixed
in two stages. First, a "base price" is laid down, serving as a reference
for all following calculations. It can be expressed in a currency basket. 17 9 Then, a series of percentage price increases are specified, or
spread out over a certain period of time. This system is usually further
refined by: (1) adjustments for different quality grades, terms of sale,
conditions of payment; (2) an inflation compensation mechanism; and
(3) transitional provisions for goods that are already in transit or have
to be delivered under existing contracts.
The minimum price provisions can be limited to a certain region
if the injury caused by the dumping was also limited to a certain
region1so Regional dumping is relatively rare, and only two regional
undertakings have been concluded.18 '
Since 1987, Screwdriver Duties can be imposed on products assembled in the EEC from imported components. There is no reason why
an undertaking could not be used to remove the need for Screwdriver
8
Duties, and such an undertaking has indeed been accepted.1 2
The provisions relating to the period of application consist of the
starting date and the term for which the undertaking is concluded.
The starting date is usually the date of acceptance by the Commission,
but there may be partial exceptions for goods that are in transit or
have to be delivered under existing contracts. The term of the undertaking is usually either one year or an unspecified period of time. If
it is a fixed period, an automatic renewal clause is usually included.
Often a notification period, usually 20 days, is included. During this
period the undertaking firm or the Commission may withdraw the
undertaking or its acceptance.
The provisions on information usually oblige the undertaking firm
to submit periodic reports to the Commission, and to allow verification
by on-the-spot investigations. 18 The provisions on evasion usually oblige the undertaking firm to do all they can to prevent evasion of the
undertaking by parallel imports or by discounts or rebates from independent importers or dealers.184

179. This currency basket need not be the ECU, which is a universal currency unit.
180. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 4(5).
181. Plasterboard Case (Spain), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/209 (O.J. 1985, L89/65); Glass
Case (Turkey & E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/36 (O.J. 1986, L51/73).
182. Electric Typewriters (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 88/300 (O.J. 1988, L128/39).
183. The 1988 Regulation expressly allows the Commission to insert these requirements
into an undertaking. Appendix, supra note 12, art. 10(5).
184. Id. art. 13.
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Sometimes the cooperation of the exporting state is sought to combat evasion. An example can be found in the Swedish hardboard case.185
In that case, the Commission accepted the undertaking only when the
Swedish government took steps to prevent parallel imports. 186 Note
that such an involvement of the exporting state distracts somewhat
from the Commission-to-firm character of anti-dumping undertakings.
3.

Results of Acceptance

Part I illustrated that the existence of dumping and injury to an
EEC industry were conditions for the imposition of protective duties.
When an undertaking is accepted, the Community authorities consider
either the dumping or the injury eliminated. 187 Consequently, the justification for protective measures is removed and anti-dumping duties
do not have to be imposed.
However, this does not imply that the Commission is in any way
bound by the undertaking. It should be borne in mind that an undertaking is an unilateral commitment: only the firm undertakes to meet
certain obligations. The Commission is prevented from imposing duties
only by its own conviction that these are no longer necessary.
Whenever the Commission considers an undertaking no longer satisfactory, either because of changed circumstances or because it chooses
another method of determining whether or not the dumping or injury
has been eliminated, it can re-open the case for review, withdraw its
acceptance from the undertaking, and impose anti-dumping duties.188
Such a review is initiated when the Commission is convinced that:
(1) the undertaking firm is violating the undertaking; (2) the undertaking firm withdraws its undertaking; or (3) other circumstances, such
as market developments, make the undertaking ineffective. A review
may lead to replacement of the undertaking by anti-dumping duties. Alternatively, sometimes a new, revised undertaking can be accepted. 90 However, this is only likely in the third case, since prior
violations are often a reason for refusing an undertaking.

185. (O.J. 1983, L361/47).
186. Id.
187. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
188. See infra discussion on the Miniature Ballbearing Cases in pt. II, § H.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Fibre Board Case (Finland & Sweden), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/35 (O.J.
1986, L46/23).
191. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 13(4)(b)(iii).
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Penalties for Violating Undertakings

When the violation of an undertaking is due to the fault or the
negligence of the undertaking firm, even though a violation may be
due to circumstances outside the undertaking firm's control, such as
parallel imports by independent importers, the EEC authorities have
a powerful punitive instrument at their disposal. If the Commission
believes an undertaking has been violated, it may re-open the investigation and impose provisional duties immediately. When subsequent
definitive duties are imposed, these may be applied retroactively to
goods imported before the imposition of provisional duties. 191 This retroactive imposition of anti-dumping duties is limited in two ways: (1)
it may not be imposed on products released into free circulation in
the Economic Community before the violation; and (2) it may not reach
back more than 90 days before imposing the provisional duties. 19
These retroactive duties are a powerful deterrent against violation.
The goods on which they are imposed will usually be brought into
free circulation and be outside the importers' control. This means that
they cannot compensate the duty through price increases and must
therefore bear the financial consequences themselves. This gives even
independent importers an incentive to comply with the provisions of
an undertaking.
However, retroactive duties do not seem to be used in practice.19
This is probably due to two reasons. First, anti-dumping duties can
discriminate between different producers, but not between different
importers. This means that the retroactive imposition will hurt all
importers, irrespective of whether they actually broke the undertaking
or not. It would be unfair to punish the innocent importers for the
violations committed by others. Second, the Commission has wide
discretionary powers in assessing the amount of anti-dumping duties.
When the Commission wants to punish an exporter for a violation, it
has ample opportunity to do so without resorting to retroactive duties.
D.

ProceduralLaw Concerning Undertakings
1. Offering Undertakings

It is a characteristic of undertakings that they must be offered by
a firm to the Commission. They cannot be imposed by the Commission
on the firm. The Commission may make suggestions concerning under-

192. Id. art. 13(4)(b).
193. Research conducted by the author revealed no cases involving the retroactive imposition
of anti-dumping duties.
194. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(3).
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takings, but the firm may not be penalized for not following these
suggestions. 19
This provision was prescribed by the GATT Anti-Dumping Code'95
to prevent the Commission from dictating undertakings to firms. However, it is doubtful if it has any effect. One of the conclusions from
part I was that the Commission has wide discretionary powers in
anti-dumping proceedings. If it would ever want to take revenge upon
an unwilling exporter, it would have ample opportunity to do so.
Under older anti-dumping legislation, there were no time limits
concerning the offering of undertakings. Apparently this led to abuses,
because the 1984 Regulation,'9 the precedessor of the current regulation, introduced a time limit.'9 According to article 7(4)(b), exporters
and importers have a right to see the information on which the Commission intends to propose definitive duties. - They may comment on
these facts during a time period specified by the Commission. Except
in urgent cases, this period is at least ten days. This period is the
outer limit for offering undertakings. Later offers are, as a rule, not
taken into consideration.19
This does not imply that undertakings may not be offered earlier.
According to article 10(1), undertakings may be offered "during the
course of an investigation.' 2- Therefore, undertakings can theoretically
be offered immediately after the notice of initiation of article 7(1)(a).
The reason for such an early offer is that an undertaking in an early
stage of the proceeding may remove the need for provisional duties.
2.

Acceptance of Undertakings

Once an undertaking has been offered, the Commission can accept
it and take no further measures, or reject it and impose anti-dumping
duties.20 1 Strictly speaking, the acceptance of an undertaking is not a
trade protection measure. It is not the Community that imposes restrictions, but rather the firm itself. Consequently, the acceptance of
an undertaking is not the adoption of a trade protection measure in
the sense of article 113 of the EEC Treaty, and does not have to be
taken by the Council.

195. GATr 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(4).
196. EEC Reg. 2176/84 (O.J. 1984, L201/1).
197. Cf. Third Report, supra note 164, at 11.
198. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 7(4)(b).
199. Id. art. 10(1).
200. Id.
201. For a discussion on the Commission's practice of accepting or refusing undertakings,
see pt. II, § D(3).
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Instead, the acceptance of an undertaking is seen as a form of
termination. As discussed in part I, section D, an anti dumping investigation can be terminated when there is no dumping, no injury, or
no Community interest. Undertakings are required to eliminate either
the dumping or the injury, so it is no longer in the interest of the
Community to impose duties. In other words, undertakings create the
circumstances under which an investigation can be terminated.
Consequently, the acceptance of an undertaking follows the same
procedure as an ordinary termination.- It is a Commission Decision
taken after consultation with the Advisory Committee. If a member
state raises objections in the Committee, the Commission submits a
proposal to the Council. If the Council does not decide upon the Commission's proposal within one month, the proposal is considered to be
accepted.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Sometimes, the acceptance of an undertaking is closely linked to the imposition of duties.
This is the case when some exporters offer acceptable undertakings
and others do not. Despite the undertakings of some exporters the
investigation cannot be terminated, because duties still have to be
imposed on the others. In such a case, a single regulation can impose
duties on the products of some exporters, and accept undertakings
and terminate the investigation concerning the products of the others.
Such a regulation can be made by the Commission, when the duties
24
are provisional,- or by the Council, when the duties are definitive. 0
The acceptance of undertakings can also be linked to the collection
of provisional duties imposed before the acceptance. In that case, the
collection of duties makes termination impossible. However, two separate legal instruments are used: a decision for the acceptance, and a
regulation for the imposition of duties. 205 As a consequence, an undertaking can be accepted by no less than four different legal instruments:
(1) a Commission Decision in normal cases; (2) a Council Decision when
the Advisory Committee objects; (3) a Commission Regulation when
linked to provisional duties; and (4) a Council Regulation when linked
to the imposition of definitive duties, or the collection of provisional
ones.

202. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
203. See, e.g., Deep Freezers Case (E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Reg. 2800/86 (O.J. 1986,
L259/14).
204. See, e.g., Ureum Case (Libya), EEC Council Reg. 3339/87 (O.J. 1987, L317/1).
205. See, e.g., Copper Sulphate Case (Poland), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/104 (O.J. 1985,
L41/13) (the commission accepted the undertaking); Council Reg. 357/85 (O.J. 1985, L41/11)
(imposing the duty).
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3.

Refusal of an Undertaking

Contrary to acceptance, refusal of an undertaking does not constitute a separate finding. When an undertaking is refused, the proceeding will continue in the normal way and will usually be concluded by
the imposition of duties.- The refusal then forms part of the regulation
imposing provisional or definitive duties.207 As discussed in part I,
provisional duties are imposed by a Commission Regulation, and definitive duties by a Council Regulation upon a proposal from the Commission.
4.

Conclusion of Investigation

Under older anti-dumping legislation, investigations were often immediately concluded after the acceptance of an undertaking, i.e. without a formal determination of dumping and injury. This possibility
still exists.- However, currently the Commission invariably completes
the investigation with at least a preliminary determination of dumping
and injury. 2 9 Article 10(4) enables an exporter who has offered an
acceptable undertaking to demand completion of the investigation.210
Given the Commission's practice of doing this anyway, this provision
is of little practical importance. It should be noted that acceptance of
an undertaking concludes the investigation but not the proceeding.
2
The proceeding lasts until the undertaking is terminated. 11
5.

Termination of Undertakings

There are three ways in which an undertaking may be terminated:
lapse, withdrawal, and review. Lapse is the termination of an undertaking by the passage of time. According to article 15(1) of the 1988
Regulation, an undertaking expires after five years. 21 2 The Commission
must place a notice in the Official Journal to warn interested parties

206. However, investigations may be terminated if no dumping, injuries, or community
interest exists in taking such measures.
207. Appendix 1, supra note 12, arts. 11 & 12.
208. Id. art. 10(4).
209. See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 221; see also Third Report, supra
note 164, at 4.
210. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(4).
211. Id. art. 15(1).
212. Id. The maximum duration of definitive duties is also five years; the GATT 1979
Anti-Dumping Code prohibits undertakings that last longer than duties. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(6).
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of the impending expiry. 2i 3 They may want to request a review proce2
dure. 14
Withdrawal is the unilateral termination of an undertaking by the
undertaking firm itself. On the basis of market developments, a firm
may decide that the financial losses due to anti-dumping duties are
preferable to the loss of market share caused by the undertaking's
minimum prices.215 Most undertakings contain a notification period,
usually 20 days, in which the firm may withdraw its undertaking. A
failure to comply with the notification provisions is considered a violation of the undertaking and may expose the firm to penalties for
violation. When an undertaking is withdrawn, the Commission can
initiate the review procedure in article 14.216
The review procedure is the only method by which the Commission
can terminate an undertaking. The review procedure is, in fact, a
re-opening of the investigation. 217 The initiation of the review procedure is similar to the initiation of an ordinary proceeding and may be
initiated by the Commission acting on its own initiative, by the request
of a member state, or by the request of an interested party.2 18 When
a review is requested by an interested party, two conditions must be
met: (1) the party must submit sufficient evidence to justify the review;
and (2) one year must have passed since the undertaking was ac-

cepted .

2

19

Contrary to the complainant who initiates an ordinary investigation, the interested party does not have to represent the EEC industry. The undertaking firm itself may do so, claiming that changed
circumstances justify changes in terms of the undertaking.
If the investigation is re-opened as a result of a withdrawal or
violation of an undertaking, the Commission can impose provisional
duties immediately on the basis of the facts established before the
acceptance of the undertaking. This provision is expressly allowed by
the GATT Code, 220 and enables quick action to be taken. In the reopened investigation, new facts can be established. It is concluded in
the same way as the original one: by the imposition of duties, the
acceptance of a revised undertaking, or by termination.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 15(2).
See pt. II, § H.
See pt. II, § B (describing the need for an "emergency exit").
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 14; see pt. II, § H.
Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 14(2).
Id. art. 14(1).
Id.
GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(5).
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E.

Commission Practice Concerning Undertakings
1. Tacit Undertakings

Under older EEC anti-dumping legislation, firms would often raise
their prices unilaterally during an anti-dumping proceeding. The Commission would then respond by terminating the investigation, thereby
resulting in a kind of tacit undertaking. "Under the Community's
earlier legislation investigations were sometimes concluded because of
changes in the market situation when the exporter raised its prices
over a considerable period of time to levels which eliminated the margins of dumping without giving a formal price undertaking." 1
This practice had a number of disadvantages: (1) it was often unclear whether there had been any dumping or injury at all;" (2)
anti-dumping proceedings were in danger of being abused as instruments to pressure foreign firms;2 (3) if a firm broke its tacit undertaking, it was impossible to take quick action; 2? and (4) a number of
firms which raised their prices without official acceptance might incur
penalties under EEC competition law.
As a consequence, this practice has been discontinued. Unilateral
price revisions by firms in order to escape anti-dumping duties are
only taken into account as part of a formal undertaking:
It is no longer the Commission's practice to conclude an
investigation on those grounds and now they are only concluded without protective measures being applied when it
has been established that the imports were not dumped...
during the period under investigation, or that they had not
caused or threatened to cause material injury to a Community industry, or for other reasons when it is not in the
the investigation or to
Community's interest to continue
226
apply protective measures.
2.

Undertakings on Behalf of Exporters

Normally, undertakings are offered by exporters who have participated in the anti-dumping investigation and expect duties to be im-

221. Second Commission Report to the European Parliament on the Anti-Dumping and
Anti-Subsidy measures of the European Community, COM (84)741 final, at 5 [hereinafter Second
Report].
222. I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 26.
223. Id.
224. Cf. pt. II, § D(5) (remarks on the conclusion of the investigation).
225. See pt. II, § G.
226. Second Report, supra note 221, at 5.
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posed on their products. However, no formal obligation exists to this
effect in the 1988 Regulation. In fact, in two situations, undertakings
have been offered by others on behalf of the exporter.2
In the first situation, an exporter authorized his agents and importers to offer undertakings on its behalf.2 The Commission accepted
these undertakings, but made it clear that this was exceptional and
should not constitute a precedent for the future:
Whereas, . . . the Soviet exporter, Energomachexport,
authorized its imports and agents.., to do what was necessary to create normal conditions for the sale of motors on
the market and to take the appropriate measures;
Whereas, on the basis of these authorizations, undertakings . . .have been offered . .. by the agents and imports
of Energomachexport in the Community, acting on the behalf
of that firm as well as on their own behalf;
Whereas, in view of the complexity of the authorization
procedure, it must be regarded as exceptional, and the acceptance of such a procedure in this case does not prejudice the
future attitude of the Commission in similar situations.
One may wonder why Energomachexport took this unusual course,
and why the Commission went along. One reason might have been
that the USSR has been rather reluctant to grant recognition to the
EEC and the offering of undertakings by a state trading organization
was seen as a form of recognition.m°
In the second situation, undertakings were offered by firms related
to the exporter, such as a parent company or member of the same
concern. These have also been accepted. For example, the Court in
the Fluid Cracking Catalysts Case (USA) stated: "Whereas ... Grace
GmbH, on behalf of itself, Grace Italiana SpA, The Davidson Chemical
Division of Grace and Co. and any other affiliates of Grace GmbH
which may sell fluid cracking catalysts in the Community has offered
undertakings which would prevent a recurrence of injury to Community producers."21

227. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
228. Standardized Electric Multi-Phase Motors Case (USSR), EEC Comm'n Decision 80/599
(0.J. 1984, L31126).
229. Id.
230. This argument is at least partially contradicted by the fact that many other Soviet
state trading organizations have shown no hesitation in concluding undertakings with the Commission.
231. EEC Comm'n Decision 82/31 (O.J. 1982, L11/15).
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The offering of an undertaking by a parent company can be an
efficient way of including a large number of subsidiaries. However,
there are some problems from a competition point of view against
undertakings concluded on behalf of several firms. These are further
discussed in part II, section G.
3.

Undertakings by Prospective Exporters

In addition, undertakings have been offered by firms that did not
actually export the product but planned to do so in the near future.
Anti-dumping duties can be imposed on all exporters from a given
country, including those who did not export at the time the duty was
imposed. Prior to 1984, these undertakings were treated as ordinary
undertakings. In that year, however, the Commission changed its
practice: undertakings from prospective exporters are, as a rule, no
longer accepted. The turning point was a case involving chemicals
from the United States, in which the Commission extensively justified
its change of practice:
(8) Two producers of dense sodium carbonate. .. , who had
never exported to the Community, offered undertakings regarding possible future exports.
(9) On previous occasions where non-exporters offered undertakings in respect of possible future exports to the Community, these undertakings were accepted or refused on the
merits of each case. This practice has been reviewed and,
as a result, it has been concluded that, in general, undertakings from potential exporters should not be accepted, on the
following grounds:
(a) it is difficult to determine an appropriate export
price for a company that has not exported to the Community, since any date ... [is] likely to relate to another
period or to another destination and would therefore be
of questionable relevance.
(b) it is also likely to be difficult or impossible . . . to
determine the volume of any possible future exports to
the Community. This is important in cases where ...
a price level is set ... to eliminate injury to the Community industry and where the volume of sales ... is
likely to be a decisive element in the computation of
this price level.
(10) For both companies, the difficulties outlined in respect
of the determination of an appropriate export price and the
assessment of the impact of future additional imports in the
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Community were encountered. This has led to the conclusion
that a departure from the approach now adopted, namely
that undertakings from non-exporters should, in general, be
32
refused, is not warranted.2
Note the last sentence: undertakings from non-exporters, prospective
exporters and importers, are now refused as a rule.
4.

Motivation for Acceptance of Undertakings

When an undertaking is accepted, the Commission seems to be
rather reluctant to publish its reasons for doing so in the Official
Journal. There are three reasons for this: (1) the Commission has very
wide discretionary powers for accepting undertakings, so there is little
necessity to justify the acceptance by extensive reasoning; (2) the
parties involved in an anti-dumping proceeding have access to more
information than the general public, so the parties most affected by
the acceptance do not have to rely on the Official Journal for information; and (3) the contents of an undertaking are often of a confidential
nature. It would be very hard to give extensive reasoning for accepting
an undertaking without giving away the essential contents.
Occassionally, the Commission does not give the most basic information and even leaves it unclear whether the undertaking eliminates
the dumping margin or the inquiry. For example, one Commission
Regulation stated: "he offered a satisfactory undertaking, of which
the effect is that the import prices ... have been increased. '"- However, it is more usual that the way the undertaking works is made
clear.2 For Example:
An undertaking was subsequently offered ....
The effect
of the said undertaking will be to increase import prices to
the Community to the level necessary to eliminate the dumping found. 2The effect of the said undertaking will be to increase export
prices to the Community to a level which the Commission...
6
considered necessary to eliminate injury. 3
The last of these two possibilities is the most frequent, because
eliminating the injury usually requires a smaller price increase than
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
26).

Sodium Carbonate Case (USA), EEC Comm'n Reg. 3337/84 (O.J. 1984, L311/48).
Pentoerythritol Case (Sweden), EEC Comm'n Reg. 2681/84 (O.J. 1984, L254/5).
See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
Copper Sulphate Case (Poland), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/104 (O.J. 1985, L41/13).
Horticultural Glass Case (E.Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 84/406 (O.J. 1984, L224/
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eliminating the dumping margin. In this respect, undertakings resemble duties since the increase is also usually aimed at eliminating the
injury rather than the dumping. If an undertaking eliminates the injury, it is often remarked upon acceptance that the increase does not
exceed the dumping margin. This underlines the requirement that
undertakings have to eliminate either the dumping or the injury, but
not both. Some indication may be given of how a price level was
7
calculated or of the factors taken into account.2
The actual obligations contained in the undertaking are rarely
given. Yet, the obligation is sometimes clearly indicated: "[tihe effect
of this undertaking will be to increase the export price by an amount
equivalent to the anti-dumping duty provisionally imposed and will be
sufficient to eliminate the injury caused by the dumped product."
The only other motivation given when an undertaking is accepted
concerns the controllability of the undertaking, or the extent to which
its performance can be monitored by the Commission. This often takes
the form of a standard phrase: "it appears that correct operation of
the undertaking can be effectively monitored."' 9 Sometimes, this argument is reinforced by the fact that previous undertakings have been
successful: "it appears that correct operation of the undertaking can
be effectively monitored, in particular since the Commission in its
investigation did not observe any violations of the undertakings previously in force."o This practice seems to have started in 1985. All
undertakings accepted in that year contain this argument. By contrast,
it does not occur in any of the undertakings concluded in 1984.
5.

Reasons for Acceptance of Undertakings

Despite the Commission's scanty motivation for the acceptance of
undertakings, the following observations can be made with respect to
the Commission's reasoning. There are more undertakings eliminating

237. "For this purpose the Commission took into account the selling price necessary to
provide an adequate return to the currently sole Community producer and to make it possible
for the other Community producers which have suspended production to start production again
....." Container Corner Fittings Case (Austria), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/443 (O.J. 1985, L

256/44); "[t]he Commission [took] into account on the one hand, the selling price necessary to
provide an adequate return to Community producers and, on the other hand, the purchase price
of the Community importers and their costs and profit margin .... Asbestos-Cement Corrugated Sheets Case (Czechoslovakia & the DDR), EEC Comm'n Decision 84/465 (O.J. 1984,
L259/48).

238.
L335/63)
239.
240.

Roller Chains for Cycles Case (USSR), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/542 (O.J. 1985,
(note that the amount of the provisional duty is known).
See, e.g., Phasterboard Case (Spain), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/209 (O.J. 1985, L89/65).
Outboard Motors Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/210 (O.J. 187, L82/36).
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the injury than eliminating dumping.', This is not surprising, since
eliminating injury usually requires smaller price increases than
eliminating dumping. For the same reason, anti-dumping duties usually
eliminate the injury, not the dumping that caused it. An important
factor in deciding whether the injury is eliminated or not is the future
profitability or economic viability of the injured EEC industry. The
possibilities for monitoring undertakings seem to be an increasingly
important factor in deciding whether or not an undertaking is accepted.
This is probably related to the Commission's increasingly heavy workload.
6.

Motivation for Refusal of Undertakings

Just as the Commission often fails to provide reasons for its acceptance of undertakings, the Commission tends to be equally reluctant
to give full reasons for their refusal of undertakings.- Quite often,
undertakings are refused with only the standard statements: "After
consultation, this undertaking was not considered acceptable by the
Commission. The exporter was informed of the reasons thereof.'"
Even the identity of the firm that offered the undertaking may be
kept confidential: "Certain producer/exporters offered to give undertakings to the Commission concerning their future exports to the Community. The Commission did not accept those undertakings. It informed the producers/exporters of the reasoning behind that deci-

sion.

-1244

Sometimes the language of the Commission is so cryptic that the
motivation only raises more questions: "[The exporters] raised the
possibility of offering a price undertaking or an undertaking on quantities. The Council shares the Commission's opinion that, regardless
of other considerations, the two formulae for undertakings put forward
are not appropriate to this case in point."245 This is totally unintelligible.
One wonders what other formula the Council could have had in mind,
given the fact that undertakings on price or quantities are the only

241. From the author's own observations, undertakings that eliminate dumping seem to be
rather rare.
242. I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 99.
243. Ferro-Silico-Calcium Case (Brazil), EEC Council Reg. 336/s7 (O.J. 1987, L322/1); Sometimes the name of the exporter is used, see, e.g., Ferro-Silicon Case (Brazil), EEC Council Reg.
3650/87 (O.J. 1987, L343/1) (using "the association"); Deep Freezers Case (USSR), EEC Council
Reg. 29/87 (O.J. 1987, L6/1) (using "Technointorg").
244. Housed Bearings Case (Japan), EEC Council Reg. 374/87 (O.J. 1987, L35/32) (numbering omitted).
245. Polystyrene Sheet Case (Spain), EEC Council Reg. 2109/85 (O.J. 1987, L198/1).
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two possible formulas for an undertaking allowed under article 10(1)
of the 1988 Regulation.
7.

Reasons for Refusal of Undertakings
If reasons are given for refusing an undertaking, they fall into five
categories. The first category is effectiveness. This covers cases in
which the Commission decided that the proposed price increases would
not lead to an end of either the dumping or of the injury, or that
proposed implementation of the price increases would take too much
time. The second category is controllability. This covers cases in which
the Commission decided that compliance with the terms of the undertakings could not be effectively controlled, because an effective
monitoring system was impossible, impractical or prohibitively expensive. The third category is past experience. This refers to cases in
which the Commission had bad experiences with undertakings concerning that firm or that industry. Violations of past undertakings fall
both into this category, and into the category in which undertakings
proved to be ineffective. This might be the case when the undertaking
firms were replaced by other dumping firms.
The fourth category is insufficient data. This refers to cases in
which the offered undertaking is not taken into account, but will be
decided upon at a later stage of the investigation. For instance, in
the Plain Paper Photocopiers Case (Japan),26 Kyocera offered an undertaking before a provisional duty could be imposed. In the Regulation imposing provisional duties, the Commission remarked: "This undertaking was not accepted by the Commission at the provisional stage
and acceptance will be reconsidered should definitive measures be
proposed. ,,27
Article 7(2) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code allows the refusal of
undertakings when they are considered "impractical. '"- Effectiveness,
controllability, past experience and insufficient data are all elaborations
of this impracticality criterion. The fifth reason for refusal has been
the possible negative effects on competition within the Community.
This is treated more fully in part II, section G.
According to Le Li~vre and Houben,- 9 there exists a sixth reason
for refusing an undertaking: trade relations. This made its first and
246. EEC Comm'n Reg. 2640/86 (O.J. 1986, L239/5); see EEC Comm'n Decision 87/135 (O.J.
1987, L54/36) (accepting the undertaking).
247. Plain Paper Photocopiers Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Reg. 2640/86 (O.J. 1986, L239/5),
at 106.
248. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(2).
249. Le Li~vre & Houben, EC versus Japan:The Community's Legal Weapons, 24 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 428, 440 (1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

47

366

INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. LAW
4, Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1989], Art. 3

[Vol. 4

only appearance in the Hydraulic Excavators Case (Japan). ° In that
case, the Commission had originally recommended accepting an undertaking, even though it was offered after the deadline of article 7(4)
of the 1984 Regulation. However, the Council imposed a duty instead:
Moreover, the Council considers that, in this particular case,
in view of the remaining doubts on the possibilities to effectively monitor price undertakings in this particular market
and in the light of the present trade relations with Japan,
it is not in the interests of the Community to have recourse
to price undertakings as an appropriate remedy for the injury
resulting from the dumped imports.?However, the Council is probably not saying that the trade relations themselves were a factor in deciding against undertakings. It is
saying that the trade relations have been taken into account when
assessing the possibilities for monitoring. The undertakings have been
refused because they were unmonitorable due in part to special circumstances in that particular market and to the trade relations with
Japan. Apparently, this made full cooperation by the Japanese authorities unlikely. In other words, the trade relations criterion is a
variant of the controllability criterion.
8.

Possible Change in Commission's Policy

It was noted in part II, section B, that in 1985 there was a marked
decrease in the number of accepted undertakings. In that year, the
proceedings concluded by the imposition of anti-dumping duties for
the first time outnumbered those concluded by the acceptance of undertakings.
This was probably accidental since only 12 anti-dumping measures
were taken that year and chance played a large role in producing the
small numbers. The number of undertakings rose from four in 1985
to eleven and six in 1985 and 1987, respectively.? 2 This did not match
the pre-1985 level, but the number of cases in which duties were
imposed also decreased. In 1986, duties were imposed in only five
cases. This suggests that 1985 was a temporary aberration. If the
number of accepted undertakings appears to have decreased, this is
probably because the number of anti-dumping measures decreased.

250. EEC Council Reg. 1877/85 (O.J. 1985, 1176/1) (the case is also peculiar because the
Commission first sent a proposal to the Council, and then modified the proposal in anticipation
of the Council's finding).
251. Id.
252. See infra Appendix 2.
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Le Li~vre and van Houben suggest another reason for the low
number of undertakings in 1985. They maintain that the refusal of
several undertakings offered by Japanese firms that year was part of
a change in the Commission's policy towards Japan.3 As a result of
the continuing trade problems with Japan, the Commission would have
adopted a hard-line policy, and would have underlined this by refusing
a number of undertakings.
Their arguments are not very convincing, mainly because their
interpretation of the Hydraulic Excavators Case2 is erroneous: the
refusals of the Japanese undertakings were normal and defensible in
there own right,- and several Japanese undertakings were accepted
in the same period. 2- Although it is not entirely impossible that future
troubled trade relations with a country would have a negative influence
on the acceptance of undertakings offered by firms from that country,
it may be impossible to prove that this played a role in the refusals
of 1985.
Another reason for the low number of undertakings concluded in
1985 might have been that the Commission was starting to feel the
burden of monitoring the undertakings previously concluded. Recent
7
annual reports mention an increased administrative burden. The 1985and 19862 Annual Reports complained that it was impossible to initiate
all the proceedings the Commission would have liked to, due to financial difficulties caused by an increased workload. The 1984 Annual
Report states that the large number of provisional duties imposed that
year was caused by administrative difficulties and problems concerning
the monitoring of undertakings.- 9 This is significant, because it shows
that administrative problems can cause less undertakings to be accepted. This point is underlined by the fact that, beginning in 1985,
Commission Decisions accepting undertakings began to contain statements that the undertakings can be effectively monitored. This
suggests that the Commission's workload made it necessary to place
greater attention on monitoring efficiency.
253. Le Libvre & Houben, supra note 249, at 439-41; see, e.g., Miniature Ballbearings Case
(Japan), EEC Council Reg. 2089/84 (O.J. 1984, L193/1); Glycine Case (Japan), EEC Council
Reg. 2322/85 (O.J. 1985, L128/1); Hydraulic Excavators Case (Japan), EEC Council Reg. 1877/85
(O.J. 1985, L176/1); Electronic Scales Case (Japan), EEC Council Reg. 1008/86 (O.J. 1986, L97/5).
254. (O.J. 1985, L176/1).
255. See pt. II, § G (the Glycine Case was not entirely normal because it was the first
undertaking to be refused for competition reasons).
256. See Le Linvre & Houben, supra note 138.
257. Fourth Report, supra note 64, at 3-4.
258. Fifth Commission Report to the European Parliament on the Anti-Dumping and AntiSubsity Measures of the European Community, COM(88) 92 final, at 3-4.
259. Third Report, supra note 164, at 4.
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The Legality of Quota Undertakings
1. Concept of Quota Undertakings

The normal form of undertaking is a price undertaking in which a
firm undertakes to maintain a certain minimum price. But this is not
the only type of undertaking. There are also quantitative undertakings,
in which a firm limits the volume of imports in the EEC. Quantitative
undertakings can be further divided into total import stops on one
hand, and quotas on the other. Quantitative undertakings as a whole
2
seem to be neglected by the literature in this field. 60
The legality of the quota undertaking has been disputed. Article
10(2)(b) allows undertakings only where "prices are revised or exports
cease to the extent that the Commission is satisfied that either the
dumping margin. . ., or the injurious effects thereof, are eliminated."61
Some have argued that the word "cease" can only mean a total cessation of all imports,2 62 while others have interpreted the phrase "cease
to the extent" as permitting quotas.2 6 The GATT Anti-Dumping Code
does not provide much guidance on this issue. Its formulation, "to
cease exports to the area in question so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated,"- is just
as open to different interpretations as the EEC Regulation.
2. Use of Quantitative Undertakings
Despite the question of legality, undertakings containing both export stops and quotas are accepted by the Commission. This is recog2
nized by some authors6 but no examples are given. -

260. The following do not even mention the possibility of quantitative undertakings: Dielmann, Anti-Dumping and Anti Subsidy Measures: The Practiceof the European Communities,
1981-1984, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 697 (1985); E.A. VANDOREN, The Interface Between
Anti-Dumping and the Competition Law and Policy in the EEC, in LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1 (1986); Le Linvre & Houben, supra note 249. In fact, only I. BAEL &
J. BELLIS, supra note 17, and J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, seem to give more
on quantitative undertakings than a citation of article 10(2)(b).
261. Appendix 1, supra note 16, art. 10(2)(b).
262. I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 102.
263. J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 215.
264. GATT 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 28, art. 7(1).
265. I. BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 17, at 102 n.18; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS,
supra note 58, at 215 (No author claims that quantitative undertakings do not occur. They
prefer to disregard them instead).
266. See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 215 n.48 (the example given is
not a true undertaking); Video Recorders Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 83/126 (O.J.
1983, L86/23) (this case is not the acceptance of an undertaking, but rather a termination
following a finding that it is not in the best interest of the community to take measures).
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Because of the general lack of motivation for the acceptance of
undertakings, examples of quantitative undertakings are hard to find.
267
The following consideration from the Urea Case (Czechoslovakia)
seems to indicate that the firm undertook to impose a quorum on its
exports to the EEC: "These undertakings were acceptable to the Commission on the grounds that they were considered to provide adequate
relief to the Community industry because they will reduce future
imports... to a reasonable share of the Community's consumption."26
The same applies under the legislation of the European Community
on Coal and Steel, which is identical to that of the EEC on undertakings: "The Yugoslavian exporter ...offered an undertaking concerning
their imports of plates and sheets, of iron and steel, to the Community.
Pursuant to this undertaking exports will be reduced to a level at
which there will be no further injury."'
It is impossible to determine how many quota undertakings exist
because of the Commission's failure to provide adequate reasons for
its decisions. However, the examples cited above, evidence the fact
that they do occur.
3.

Legality of Quota Undertakings

There are two arguments against quota undertakings. First, article
10 of the 1988 Regulation speaks of "ceasing" exports, implying that
exports would stop completely. 2 O Second, quantitative restrictions on
27
imports normally have to be taken under the 1982 Regulation. 1
The first argument is based solely on grammatical interpretation
and should therefore be rejected. Both the EEC and GATT Code
legislation allow some discretion to the anti-dumping authorities, who
must be satisfied that the dumping or the injury is eliminated. This
provision only makes sense for undertakings involving quotas. After
all, total import stops would always eliminate both the dumping and
the injury since nonexistent imports cannot be dumped and cannot do
harm. The fact that the anti-dumping authorities are allowed the freedom to judge whether a quantitative undertaking is acceptable can
only mean that the quantitative undertaking can be something other
than a total cessation of imports.

267. EEC Council Reg. 3339/87 (O.J. 1987, L317/1).
268. Id.
269. Iron & Steel Sheets & Plates Case (Yugoslavia), ECSC Comm'n Decision 86/639 (O.J.
1986, L371/84).
270. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10 (the same applies to texts of the Regulation in
other languages: "beeindigen," "cessation").
271. EEC Reg. 288/82 (O.J. 1982, L35/1).
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The second argument should also be rejected, because it does not
recognize the differences between anti-dumping measures under the
1988 Regulation and safeguard measures under the 1982 Regulation.272
Anti-dumping legislation seeks to prevent injury to the EEC industry
by certain trade practices. By contrast, safeguard measures are not
aimed at any particular behavior, but rather are aimed at preventing
damage by a sudden increase in imports.273 The two regulations also

use different conditions for taking protective measures. Anti-dumping
measures require dumping, injury, and Community interest.
Safeguard measures require imports in greatly increased quantities,
serious injury, and Community interest.
In other words, the two Regulations are basically different in their
purpose and their field of application. Therefore, one cannot use the
existence of measures based on one regulation to establish an argument
against measures based on the other.
Apart from these two arguments, no reason to prohibit quotas
undertakings exists. Since the Commission has the power to accept
undertakings containing total export stops, it should also have the
power to accept those containing less drastic quotas.
One can even argue that quota undertakings are the only practical
form of quantitative undertakings. After all, undertakings have to be
more attractive to a firm than duties, otherwise nobody would offer
them. However, paying duties will always be preferable to total export
stops. Thus, there seems little use for quantitative undertakings containing total export stops.
G.

Undertakings and Competition

1. Relation of Competition and Anti-Dumping Law

As discussed in part I, section B, EEC anti-dumping law has two
purposes: protectionism by hindering imports, and protection of competition by prevention of predatory dumping. The latter is also the
purpose of EEC competition law. Despite this common purpose, antidumping and competition legislation have traditionally been considered
to be entirely separate entities, operating on different levels of trade.
According to this view, competition legislation would take care of
distortions of competition within the common market, or the "internal
sphere." The function of anti-dumping legislation was to prevent the

272. Compare Appendix 1, supra note 12, with EEC Reg. 288/82 (O.J. 1982, L35/1); see
pt. II, § B.
273. See EEC Reg. 288/82 arts. 15(1) & 16(1).
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anti-competitive effects of international trade practices from influencing that common market, or the "external sphere." Consequently,
anti-dumping measures were considered not to influence competition
within the common market. Instead, they supposedly protected competition by eliminating anti-competitive "contaminations" resulting
from dumping. This view is reflected in the internal organization of
the Commission: anti-dumping policy is handled by the DirectorateGeneral for external relations (DG I), while competition policy has its
own specialized Directorate-General (DG IV).
2. Mutual Influence of Anti-Dumping and Competition
However, several developments have undermined this tidy division
into internal and an external spheres of action. First, competition law
itself has become external with the adoption of the "effects doctrine.'274
Fixing prices by firms in a third country may be a violation of article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty, if it has anti-competitive effects within the
Community. 5 In other words, anti-competition legislation can be used
against predatory dumping, i.e. dumping with the aim or effect of
driving competitors from the market. This seems to make anti-dumping
legislation superfluous as far as it seeks to prevent destruction of
competition by dumping. In practice, the use of competition law against
predatory dumping is rare.
276
A possible reason for this is that predatory dumping itself is rare.
First, competition law is potentially a more attractive method of legal
protection for the victim. 27 Second, anti-dumping law has become internal with the adoption of the Screwdriver Regulation,278 which allows
anti-dumping duties to be imposed on products assembled in the Community. Such duties have indeed been imposed, and recently antidumping undertakings concerning "screwdriving" have been accepted.2 79 This regulation has received a lot of criticism, since it leads
to anti-dumping measures directed against Community-produced goods
and, in effect, rewrites the rules of origin of goods.- ° Third, the Commission itself has admitted that anti-dumping measures can have anticompetitive effects.-, l
274.
PEN

V.

VAN THEMAAT, INLEIDING TOT HER RECHT VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAP-

321 (198).

275. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(1).
276. Stegemann, supra note 23, at 466.
277. For example, competition law can be invoked for the national judiciary, independent
of the Commission, thereby enabling the victim to recover damages.
278. EEC Reg. 1761/87 (O.J. 1987, L 167/9).
279. Electric Typewriters Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 88/300 (O.J. 1988, L128/39).
280. Bael, Creeping Protectionism, J. WORLD TRADE L. 5, 7 (1987).
281. See Glycine Case (Japan), EEC Council Reg. 2322/85 (O.J. 1985, L218/1).
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Types of Mutual Influence

This risk of mixing the spheres of action of anti-dumping and
competition law is particularly acute with undertakings. Anti-dumping
duties resemble import duties, which are considered to have no influence on competition. However, anti-dumping undertakings resemble
price-fixing or quantity-fixing agreements, both of which fall under
the prohibition of article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, without the possibility of an exemption under article 85(3).2
Theoretically, price increases or quota resulting from an undertaking could also amount to a violation of article 86 of the EEC Treaty,
if the firm had a dominant position.
However, in such cases, it is
the price increase itself that constitutes the violation, not the undertaking. The undertaking itself is neutral: without the undertaking, the
price increase would be just as unlawful. For this reason, this paper
will not consider violations of article 86, but will rather concentrate
on article 85.
Undertakings and competition considerations can influence each
other in two ways. First, they can influence each other by using
anti-dumping arguments to justify undertaking-like agreements between firms, and second, by the anti-competitive effects of formal
undertakings.
4.

Competition Law and Undertaking-Like Agreements

The first way in which anti-dumping and competition law influence
each other is when competing firms take concerted actions with the
aim of preventing or hindering dumping: a kind of "do-it-yourself'
anti-dumping measure. There is very clear precedent for this type of
activity. In the IFTRA Case,2 the Commission took action under
article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty against a restrictive agreement among
importers of aluminum that was intended to prevent dumping. In the
Decision, the Commission took into consideration that:
It is, moreover, necessary, as far as sales between the common market and third countries . . . are concerned, that the
appraisal of whether acts can be considered dumping and
the imposition of definitive measures under the existing rules
relating to dumping are matters which may be undertaken
only by a competent authority, namely, a national authority

282. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85(1) & 85(3).
283. Id. art. 86.
284. IFTRA Rules for Producers of Virgin Aluminium (IV/27.000), EEC Comm'n Decision
75/497 (O.J. 1975, L228/3).
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or the Commission of the European Communities. Any other
method is open to the risk of abuse. Such an authority is
the only entity entitled to assess ... whether the imposition
of anti-dumping measures which interfere with the free
movement of goods is justified. 5
Ten years later, the Commission followed the same line of reasoning
in another case involving an attempt to channel all imports via certain
distributors and impose minimum prices and quota:
Undertakings are not entitled to make restrictive agreements which damage the interests of competitors and consumers merely because they consider that the existing legislation is not adequate or practical for their purposes. The
alleged impracticality of legislation is a matter of legislative
correction and does not justify the making of restrictive
agreements by undertakings. 2
These cases show the Commission's position: there is no place for
collective anti-dumping measures by firms acting on their own initiative. Anti-dumping measures can only be taken through the proper
anti-dumping procedure, and its shortcomings can never be an excuse
for restrictive agreements. Any other approach would invite all kinds
of restrictive agreements under the guise of anti-dumping agreements.
The Commission's line of reasoning applies equally to agreements between EEC producers, between foreign exporters, or between both.
A consequence of these precedents is that the "tacit agreements"
discussed in part II, section D, are potentially vulnerable to competition action under article 85 of the EEC Treaty since they have not
been approved by the Commission. If several exporters were to enter
into tacit agreements, it could be a form of concerted action prohibited
by article 85. Therefore, from a competition point of view, the Commission's policy not to conclude tacit undertakings is consistent, and
should be favorably looked upon.
5. Competition and Formal Undertakings
One of elements of a violation of article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty
is some form of agreement or cooperation between firms. Con-

285. Id.
286. Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe (IV/26.870), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/206
(O.J. 1985, L92/1) (this was a competition case and the word "undertaking" is used to mean
"enterprise" or "firm," instead of "anti-dumping undertaking").
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sequently, a single undertaking cannot constitute a violation of article
85(1), since it is an agreement not between firms, but between a single
firm and the Commission.
However, there are two ways in which firms can cooperate with
regard to undertakings: (1) by using a single undertaking as a basis
for concerted action, e.g. a price alignment at the level of the minimum
price; (2) by cooperating when concluding undertakings with the Commission. A number of price-fixing agreements with the Commission
could, after all, have the same result as an agreement between the
firms.
Concerning the first form of anti-competitive conduct, it is not the
undertaking but rather the price alignment that is anti-competitive.
The undertaking is neutral: if the price alignment had another basis,
it would be just as anti-competitive. For this reason, this abuse of
undertakings will be left aside, just like the abuse of undertakings by
dominant firms described above.
The second form of anti-competitive action can be countered by
keeping the various undertakings as separate as possible. This can be
achieved in three ways: (1) by keeping the contents of the undertakings
secret, (2) by keeping the undertakings independent of each other.
Vandoren notes that the Commission will refuse undertakings that
make the maintenance of minimum prices conditional upon the maintenance of minimum prices by other firms, 2 7 (3), by testing undertakings
on their possible cumulative anti-competitive effects before they are
accepted. Such tests are indeed conducted.2
6. Testing Undertakings for Anti-Competitive Effects
The only way to determine if the Commission actually tests undertakings for their anti-competitive effects is to find a precedent: a case
in which an undertaking was refused for anti-competition reasons.
Such a case indeed exists. The Glycine Case (Japan),- 9 concerned the
importation of glycine from Japan. This product was only made by
two Japanese producers, both accused of dumping, and by one European producer. The two Japanese producers claimed that an anti-dumping duty would be against the interests of the Community, namely
the competition policy of the EEC.- The duty would enable the European producer to undercut their prices and drive them out of the

287.
288.
289.
290.

E.A. VANDOREN, supra note 260, at 9.
See pt. II, § G(6).
EEC Council Reg. 2322/85 (O.J. 1985, L218/1).
Id.
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market. The producers offered price undertakings instead. The undertakings were refused because of their potential anti-competitive effect:
The decision to impose the same anti-dumping duty on both
companies was based on a thorough analysis of the nature
of the price undertaking offered and of the glycine market.
In a market where only a limited number of companies are
competing with each other an alignment of prices resulting
from undertakings of the kind offered by the Japanese companies, i.e. to respect the same minimum price, would reduce
competition. This effect ... would be less likely to occur as
a result of the imposition of the same anti-dumping duty,
because existing differences in the prices charged ... would
continue. 291
For the same reason, the definitive duty was lower than it would
otherwise have been: "In view of the probable effect on the competitive
situation and structure in the Community market. . ., it is considered
in the Community's interest to take protective measures without fully
eliminating the injury . .. , but considered to be adequate to enable
the said producer, to operate economically the plant . . . ."
This is the only instance in which an undertaking was explicitly
refused because of its anti-competitive effect. 293 Given the limited motivation that the Commission gives when an undertaking is accepted or
refused, it is impossible to say if it has been used on other occasions.
If it has been used before, it could not have been very often. This
might be explained by asssuming that the Commission has only recently begun to pay attention to competition considerations.
Yet, this case shows that the Commission recognizes the fact that
anti-dumping measures are not competition-neutral. Anti-dumping
measures can influence the competitive situation within the common
market. It is also recognized that some anti-dumping measures are
more anti-competitive than others, and that competition considerations
are taken into account when a choice is made between measures such
as accepting an undertaking and refusing it and imposing a duty.
H.

Judicial Review Concerning Undertakings
1. Admissibility

As was shown in part I, section E, there are some admissibility
problems associated with the judicial review of anti-dumping findings
291.
292.
293.

Id.
22(b).
Id. 18.
The author has not been able to find another.
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that are caused by the requirement of direct and individual concerns
of article 173(2) of the EEC Treaty.- As was discussed in part II,
section C, findings with regard to undertakings can be divided into
three categories, which will then be dealt with separately: (1) acceptance of an undertaking, either as part of a Regulation imposing duties
or separately, as a Decision; (2) refusal of an undertaking and consequent imposition of duties; and (3) initiation of a review procedure
concerning an undertaking, or refusal to do so.
2.

Acceptance of Undertakings

When an undertaking is accepted, there are two parties that may
raise objections: the complainant who would have preferred duties,
and other exporters whose undertakings have not been accepted and
who fear a competitive disadvantage against their colleague. Further,
the finding itself can be of two different types: a finding as a separate
decision to terminate, or as part of a regulation, if definitive duties
are imposed or provisional duties collected at the same time.M
As was shown in part II, section C, the termination of a proceeding
due to acceptance of an undertaking is procedurally the same as the
termination due to any other cause. Consequently, the complainant
would seem to be able to challenge the Decision according to the
reasoning given in part I, section E, and following the Timex- and
FEDIOL2 97 Cases. In this respect, it does not matter whether the
acceptance is by decision or by regulation: the complainant is equally
affected by both.
Other persons would not be able to challenge the acceptance since
they would not be directly and individually affected. This is comparable
to the situation with regard to the imposition of duties: dumping firms
cannot challenge the undertakings of their competitors, just as they
cannot challenge the duties imposed on their competitors, or the termination of the investigation with respect to their competitors.
3.

Refusal of Undertakings

When an undertaking has been refused, the exporters and importers might want to challenge the refusal. When an undertaking is
refused, an anti-dumping duty is imposed instead. There is no separate
finding to refuse: the refusal is part of the regulation that imposes

294.
295.
296.
297.

EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173(2).
See pt. II, § C(3) (explaining the procedural side of undertakings).
1985 ECR 861, case 264/82.
1983 ECR 2913, case 191/82.
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the duty. Consequently, it is the regulation that must be challenged.
So, in effect, the exporter/importer appeals not against the refusal,
but against the duty that the undertaking was supposed to make
unnecessary.
Consequently, the rules for appeal against the imposition of antidumping duties described in part I, section E, apply here. The complainant has a right of appeal if he participated actively in the investigation. Exporters singled out in the regulation by being named or
by being actively involved in the proceeding can also appeal, as can
their associated importers. Independent importers have only recourse
to the Court via a preliminary inquiry cited in article 177 of the EEC
Treaty.2
4.

Review of Undertakings

It was shown in the previous section that the review procedure
is, in fact, a re-opening of the original investigation. The finding to
review an undertaking can therefore be likened to the finding to initiate
an anti-dumping investigation. This means that it is not a final measure, but a provisional one intended to pave the way for a measure
that definitively sets out the Commission's position. Therefore, the
undertaking firm cannot challenge the Commission's position. As a
consequence, the undertaking firm cannot challenge the Commission's
finding to re-open the investigation. The precedent set by the IBM
Case2 shows appeal is only allowed against final measures, not against
provisional ones. It also means that a refusal to re-open the investigation must be compared to the refusal of an anti-dumping complaint.
The FEDIOL Case 300 shows that the complainant can challenge
such a refusal, because procedural rights caused him to be directly
and individually affected. The situation is similar for a third party
requesting a review procedure. He has procedural rights that are
similar to those that the Court attributed to a complainant in FEDIOL:
the right to request, to submit evidence, to have his request examined
with due care, and to be informed of the outcome. As a consequence,
a third party requesting a review of an undertaking would be able to
challenge a refusal by the Commission to do so.
5.

Review Standards

Findings that accept, refuse, or review undertakings are subject

298.
299.
cases).
300.

EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
1981 ECR 2639, case 60/81; see pt. I, § B (discussing the IBM and FEDIOL
1983 ECR 2913, case 191/82.
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to the same review standard as anti-dumping findings in general. In
other words, such findings will only be annulled if it can be shown
that there has been (1) a violation of the rules of procedure, (2) insufficient motivation, (3) material incorrectness of the facts used as a
basis for the finding, (4) manifest errors of judgment, or (5) misuse
of powers. As stated in part I, section E, this leads to wide discretionary powers for the Commission.
The chances for annulment of a finding concerning undertakings
are even less than that for the annulment of anti-dumping findings in
general. While, for instance, the establishment of a dumping margin
or of injury to an EEC industry is subject to at least some guidelines
in the 1988 Regulation, the Commission is completely on its own when
assessing the merits of undertakings. The only criterion is that of
article 10(1), that the Commission must be satisfied that the undertaking eliminates either the dumping margin or the injury.3s 1 When this
criterion is coupled with the wide margin of discretion allowed to the
Commission by the Court, it becomes clear that the chance for annulment of a finding concerning undertakings is very slim. This is well
illusatrated by the Court's reasoning in the Miniature Ballbearing
3 62
Cases.
In these cases, a number of exporters had concluded undertakings
in 1981. In 1984, the Commission withdrew its acceptance and reopened the investigation. This time, it used a different method of
calculation, and came to the conclusion that the undertakings had not
eliminated the injury to the EEC industry, and imposed anti-dumping
o

duties. 303
The exporters claimed that the Community authorities had not
taken into account the undertakings they had offered and their voluntary price increases (as a form of tacit agreement). The Court held
in this respect that:
51. It must first be stressed that no provision of Regulation
No. 3017/70 compels the institutions to accept price undertakings which are offered. On the contrary, it is clear from

301. Appendix 1, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
302. The following cases are collectively known as the Miniature Ballbearing cases: NTN
Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council of the EC, case 240/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet reported);
Nachi/Fujikoshi Co. v. Council of the EC, case 255/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet reported);
Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council of the EC, case 256/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet reported);
Nippon Seiko Co. v. Council of the EC, case 258/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet reported);
Minibea Co. v. Council of the EC, case 260/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet reported).
303. Id.
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Article 10 thereof that it is for the institutions, in the exercise
of their discretionary power, to determine whether such undertakings are acceptable. NSK has not shown that the
reasons for refusing the undertakings offered set out in paragraph 24 of the preamble to the contested regulation exceeded the margin of discretion conferred on the institutions.
52. Secondly, it must be stated that Regulation No. 3017/79
makes no provision for the taking into account of voluntary
price increases made after the period covered by the investigation. The decision-making process includes an investigation, the initiation and course of which are governed by
Article 7. It is, at the same time, clear from the fourteenth
and fifteenth recitals in the preamble to the regulation that
the investigation procedure should not prevent rapid and
efficient action by the Community.
53. It is therefore impossible to accept that the anti-dumping proceeding may not be terminated or a decision to impose
a definitive anti-dumping duty may not be adopted merely
because the companies which are subject to the provisional
anti-dumping duty have made voluntary price increases after
the end of the period covered by the investigation period. 3°
This shows that, first, the Commission may use its full discretionary
powers in deciding whether or not to accept an undertaking, and
second, that the Commission's policy to refuse tacit undertakings is
approved by the Court.
The exporters also claimed that the principle of legal certainty
prevented the Commission from changing the method of calculation
and discontinuing the undertakings:
32. In the first place it should be stressed that under Article
14 of Regulation 3017/70 decisions to accept undertakings
may be subject to review, which, according to paragraph (3)
thereof, may result in the amendment, repeal, or annulment
of the measures adopted in connexion with such undertakings. Therefore the principle of legal certainty did not prevent the measures adopted in 1981 from being re-examined.
33. Secondly, it should be recalled that under Article
2(13)(b) of Regulation 3017/79, . . . the transaction-by-trans-

304. Nippon Seiko Co. v. Council of the EC, case 258/84 (July 5, 1987 judgment not yet
reported) (citations omitted).
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action method is one of the methods which may be adopted
by the institutions in order to calculate the dumping margin
where, as in this case, prices vary.
34. Consequently, as the Court held in its judgment of 28
October 1982 in case 52/81 (Faust v. Commission, [1982]ECR
3742), where the institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in
the choice of the means needed to achieve their policies,
trader's cannot claim to have a legitimate expectation that
the means originally chosen will be maintained, since these
may be altered by the institutions in the exercise of their
powers.
35. Lastly, the rules of sound administration cannot prevent
the institutions from using the powers conferred upon them
by the regulations in force. 305
I.

Summary of Part H

The main points of interest from the preceding discussion of antidumping undertakings are:
(1) From a substantive point of view, undertakings are very
much like anti-dumping duties, since they eliminate either
the dumping or the injury and they have the same duration.
(2) From a procedural point of view, undertakings are much
more like terminations, since they are usually accepted by
the Commission according to the same procedure as terminations and do not constitute protective measures in the sense
of article 113 of the EEC Treaty. 30
(3) From a judicial protection point of view, anti-dumping
findings associated with undertakings can be treated as ordinary findings not associated with undertakings: the acceptance can be challenged as if it were a termination, the
refusal can be challenged because it is a regulation imposing
duties, and the review can be challenged as if it were the
initiation of an investigation;
(4) The Commission rigidly keeps to the procedural
framework for undertakings, and tacit undertakings are no
longer taken into account when imposing duties.

305.
306.

Id.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113.
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(5) Undertakings are normally concluded only by exporters
or related firms, and undertakings from prospective exporters are no longer accepted.
(6) Apart from competition considerations, undertakings
seem to be refused only when they do not work, according
to the impracticality criterium of the GATT Code; this is
the case when an undertaking either is itself ineffective or
cannot be monitored effectively.
(7) Contrary to anti-dumping duties, that can be left to the
customs authorities, undertakings require looking after, and
considerable evidence that the Commission has begun to feel
the burden of monitoring all the undertakings it has accepted
exists.
(8) There is no evidence that Commission has ever used
trade relations with a particular country as an argument to
refuse undertakings, but it may happen in the future.
(9) The Commission seems to be burdened by its increased
workload, but there is no evidence that this has led to the
refusal of undertakings, yet more attention is being paid to
effective monitoring of undertakings.
IV.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Undertakings in EEC anti-dumping law are of a strangely ambiguous nature. On one hand, they are similar to anti-dumping duties in
that they are both aimed at eliminating either the dumping or the
resulting injury to the EEC industry. On the other hand, they are
not considered trade protection measures under article 113 of the EEC
Treaty, 30 7 and do not have to be enforced by the Council.
From a strictly legal point of view, undertakings are very similar
to the termination of investigations when there is no dumping, no
injury, or no Community interest in taking measures. The acceptance
of an undertaking follows the same procedure as a termination, and
so does the refusal of an undertaking: like a refusal to terminate, it
is not a separate finding, but part of the imposition of duties. Both
the acceptance and the refusal of undertakings are subject to the same
rules for judicial review as the ordinary anti-dumping findings they
resemble most. The acceptance can be challenged as if it were a termination, and the refusal as the imposition of duties it forms part of.

307.

Id.
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Undertakings can contain the obligation to maintain a certain
minimum price, the obligation to limit exports to the EEC to a certain
quota, or the obligation to stop exporting the product to the EEC. In
addition, undertakings can contain obligations concerning monitoring
the performance of the undertaking. There is some evidence that the
Commission is feeling the burden of monitoring all the undertakings
concluded in the past, and that the ability to be efficiently monitored
might play an increasingly important role in the Commission's decision
to accept or reject an undertaking.
The Commission's discretionary powers for such a decision are
greater than is normal in anti-dumping proceedings. Undertakings are
usually refused because they do not eliminate the dumping or the
injury, or because they cannot be monitored efficiently. The Commission is allowed near-complete freedom to choose the methods for determining the existence of dumping and injury. Given the large variety
of techniques available, this means that the Commission has a correspondently near-complete freedom to determine whether the undertaking eliminates the dumping or injury. The Commission also has broad
discretionary freedom to determine whether it can monitor an undertaking efficiently.
The same applies to the termination of undertakings. The Commission can at all times re-open the investigation either at the request
of a member-state or an interested party, or on its own initiative. It
can re-calculate the dumping and the injury using a different technique,
and can replace the undertaking with a duty.
Undertakings are usually refused because they do not eliminate
the dumping or the injury or because they cannot be monitored efficiently. In one case, the undertakings were refused because of their
negative effect on the competitive situation in the common market.3
This refusal puts an end to the traditional fiction that anti-dumping
measures are competition-neutral.
The motivation given for the acceptance or the refusal of undertaking is scanty. This is partially alleviated by the fact that the interested
parties participating in the anti-dumping investigation have access to
more information than is published in the Official Journal. However,
it is normal in anti-dumping proceedings that the interests of parties
that do not take part in the investigations are generally not taken
into account.

308.

FEDIOL Case, 1983 ECR 2913, case 191/82; see pt. II, § H(3).
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(Acts whose publication is obligatory)

COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2423/88
of iI July 1988
on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the
European Economic Community

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in particular Article 113
thereof,
Having regard to the Regulations establishing the common
organization of agricultural markets and the Regulations
adopted under Article 235 of the Treaty applicable to goods
manufactured from agricultural products, and in particular
the provisions of those Regulaions which allow for
derogation from the general principle that protective
measures at frontiers may be replaced solely by the measures
provided for in those Regulations,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Whereas by Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 (i), as amended
by Regulation (EEC) No 1761/87 (2), the Council adopted
common rules for protection against dumped or subsidized
imports from countries which are not members of the
European Economic Community;
Whereas these rules were adopted in accordance with
existing international obligations, in particular those arising
from Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (hereinafter referred to as 'GATT), from the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT
(1979 Anti-Dumping Code) and from the Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXHI
of the GATT (Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties);
Whereas in applying these rules it is essential, in order to
maintain the balance of rights and obligations which these
Agreements sought to establish, that the Community take
account of their interpretation by the Community's major
trading partners, as reflected in legislation or established
practice;
Whereas it isdesirable that the rules for determiningnormal
value should be presented dearly and in sufficient detail;
OJ No L 201, 30.7. 1984, p. 1.
(:) OJ No L 167, 26.6. 1987, p. 9.
(I)

whereas it should bespecifically provided that where sales on
the domestic market of the country of export or origin do not
for any reason form a proper basis for determining the
existence of dumping, recourse may behad to a constructed
normal value; whereas it is appropriate to give examples of
situations which may be considered as not representing the
ordinary course of trade, in particular where a product is sold
at prices which are less than the costs of production, or where
transactions take place between parties which are associated
or which have a compensatory arrangement; whereas it is
appropriate to list the possible methods of determining
normal value in such circumstances;
Whereas it is expedient to define the export price and to
enumerate the necessary adjustments to be made in those
cases where reconstruction of this price from the first
open-market price is deemed appropriate;
Whereas, for tie purpose of ensuring a fair comparison
between export price and normal value, it is advisable to
establish guidelines for determining the adjustments to be
made in respect of differences in physical characteristics, in
quantities, in conditions and terms of sale and to draw
attention to the fact that the burden of proof falls on any
person claiming such adjustments;
Whereas the term 'dumping margin' should be dearly defined
and the Community's established practice for methods of
calculation, where prices or margins vary, codified;
Whereas it seems advisable to lay down, in adequate detail,
the manner in which the amount of any subsidy is to be
determined;
Whereas it seems appropriate to set out certain factors which
may be relevant for the determination of injury;
Whereas it is necessary to lay down the procedures for
anyone acting on behalf of a Community industry which
considers itself injured or theatened by dumped or subsidized
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imports to lodge a complaint; whereas it seems appropriate
to make it clear that in the case of withdrawal of a complaint,
proceedings may, but need not necessarily, be terminated;
Whereas there should be cooperation between the Member
States and the Commission, both as regards information
about the existence of dumping or subsidization and injury
resulting therefrom, and as regards the subsequent
examination of the matter at Community level; whereas, to
this end, consultations should take place within an advisory
committee;
Whereas it is appropriate to lay down dearly the rules of
procedure to be followed during the investigation, in
particular the rights and obligations of the Community
authorities and the parties involved, and the conditions
under which interested parties may have access to
information and may ask to be informed of the essential facts
and considerations on the basis of which it is intended to
recommend definitive measures;
Whereas it is desirable to state explicitly that the
investigation of dumping or subsidization should normally
cover a period of not less than six months immediately prior
to the initiation of the proceeding and that final
determinations must be based on the facts established in
respect of the investigation period;
Whereas to avoid confusion, the use of the terms
'investigation' and 'proceeding' in this Regulation should be
clarified;
Whereas it is necessary to require that when information is to
be considered as being confidential, a request to this effect
must be made by the supplier, and to make dear that
confidential information which could besummarized but of
which no non-confidential summary hasbeen submitted may
bedisregarded;
Whereas, in order to avoid undue delays and for
administrative convenience, it is advisable to introduce time
limits within which undertakings may be offered;
Whereas it is necessary to lay down more explicit rules
concerning the procedure to be followed after withdrawal or
violation of undertakings;
Whereas it is necessary that the Community's
decision-making process permit rapid and efficient action, in
particular through measures taken by the Commission, as for
instance the imposition of provisional duties;
Whereas, in order to discourage dumping, it is appropriate to
provide, in cases where the facts as finally established show
that there is dumping and injury, for the possibility of
definitive collection of provisional duties even if the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss2/3
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imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty is not decided
on, on particular grounds;
Whereas it is essential, in order to ensure that anti-dumping
and countervailing duties are levied in a correct and uniform
manner, that common rules for the application of such duties
be laid down; whereas, by reason of the nature of the said
duties, such rules may differ from the rules for the levying of
normal import duties;
Whereas experience gained from the implementation of
Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 has shown that assembly in
the Community of products whose importation in a finished
state issubject to anti-dumping duty may give rise to certain
difficulties;
Whereas in particular:
-

where assembly or production is carried out by a party
which is related or associated to any of the manufacturers
whose exports of the like product are subject to an
anti-dumping duty, and

-

where the value of the parts or materials used in the
assembly or production operation and originating in the
country of origin of the product subject to. an
anti-dumping duty exceeds the value of all other part& or
materials used,

such assembly or production is considered likely to lead to
circumvention of the anti-dumping duty;
Whereas, in order to prevent circumvention, it is necessary to
provide for the collection of an anti-dumping duty on
products thus assembled or produced;
Whereas it is necessary to lay down the procedures and
conditions for the collection of duty in such
circumstances;
Whereas the amount of anti-dumping duty collected should
be limited to that necessary to prevent circumvention;
Whereas provision should be made for the review of
regulations and decisions to be carried out, where
appropriate, in part only;
Whereas, in order to avoid abuse of Community procedures
and resources, it is appropriate to lay down a minimum
period which must elapse after the conclusion of aproceeding
before such a review may be conducted, and to ensure that
there is evidence of a change in circumstances sufficient to
justify a review;
Whereas it is necessary to provide that, after a certain period
of time, anti-dumping and countervailing measures will lapse
unless the need for their continued existence can be
shown;
Whereas appropriate procedures should be established for
examining applications for refunds of anti-dumping duties;
whereas there is a need to ensure that refund procedures
apply only in respect of definitive duties or amounts of any
provisional duty which have been definitively collected, and
to streamline the existing procedures for refunds;
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Whereas this Regulation should not prevent the adoption of
special measures where this does not run counter to the
Community's obligations under the GATT;
Whereas agricultural products and products derived
therefrom might also be dumped or subsidized; whereas it is,
therefore, necessary to supplement the import rules generally
applicable to these products by making provision for
protective measures against such practices;
Whereas, in addition to the above considerations, which, in
essence, led to the adoption of Regulation (EEC) No
2176/84, experience has shown that it is necessary to define
more precisely certain of the rules to be applied and the
procedures to be followed in the context of anti-dumping
proceedings;
Whereas, for the determination of normal value, it is
appropriate to ensure that when this is based on domestic
prices, the price should bethat actually paid or payable in the
ordinary course of trade in the exporting country or country
of origin and, therefore, the treatment of discounts and
rebates should be clarified, in particular, with regard to
deferred discounts which may be recognized if evidence is
produced that they were not introduced to distort the normal
value. It isalso desirable to state more explicitly how normal
value is established on the basis of constructed value, in
particular, that the selling, general and administrative
expenses and profit should be calculated, depending on the
circumstances, by reference to the expenses incurred and the
profit realized on profitable sales made by the exporter
concerned or by other producers or exporters or on any
reasonable basis. In addition, it is appropriate to state that,
where the exporter neither produces nor sells the like product
in the country or origin, the normal value shall normally be
established by reference to the prices or costs of the exporter's
supplier. Finally, it is considered necessary to define more
precisely the conditions under which sales at a loss may be
considered asnot having been made in the ordinary course of
trade;
Whereas, for the determination of export prices, it is
advisable to ensure that this is based on the price actually
paid or payable and, therefore, the treatment of discounts
and rebates should be clarified. In cases where the export
price has to be reconstructed, it is necessary to state that the
costs to be used in this reconstruction include those normally
borne by an importer but paid by any party which appears to
be associated with the importer or exporter;

385

such selling expenses, it isappropriate, for reasons of clarity,
to specify that no allowance should be made for general
selling expenses since such expenses are not directly related to
the sales under consideration with the exception of
salesmen's salaries which should not be treated differently
to commissions paid. For reasons of administrative
convenience, it is also appropriate to specify that claims for
individual adjustments which are insignificant should be
disregarded;
Whereas, it is expedient to clarify Community practice with
regard to the use of averaging and sampling techniques;
Whereas, in order to avoid undue disruption to proceedings,
it is advisable to clarify that the supply of false or misleading
information may lead to such information being disregarded
and any claims to which it refers being disallowed;
Whereas, experience has shown that, it is necessary to
prevent the effectiveness of anti-dumping duties being eroded
by the duty being borne by exporters. It is appropriate to
in such circumstances, additional
confirm that,
anti-dumping duties may be imposed, where necessary
retroactively;
Whereas, experience has also shown that the rules relating to
the expiry of anti-dumping and countervailing measures
should be clarified. For this purpose and in order to facilitate
the administration of these rules, provision should bemade
for the publication of a notice of intention to carry out a
review;
Whereas, it is appropriate to state more explicitly the
methods to be used in the calculation of the amount to any
refund, thus confirming the consistent practice of the
Commission, as regards refunds and the relevant principles
countained in the notice which the Commission has
published concerning the reimbursement of anti-dumping
duties (i);

Whereas, it is appropriate to take advantage of this
opportunity to proceed to aconsolidation of the provisions in
question,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article I

Whereas, for the comparison of normal value and export
prices, it is necessary to ensure that this is not distorted by
claims for adjustments relating to factors which are not
directly related to the sales under consideration or by claims
for factors already taken into account. It is therefore
appropriate to define precisely the differences which affect
price comparability and to lay down more explicit rules on
how any adjustment should be made, in particular, for
differences in physical characteristics, transport, packing,
credit, warranties and other selling expenses. With regard to

Applicability

This Regulation lays down provisions for protection against
dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members
of the European Economic Community.
(1) OJ No C 266, 22. 10. 1986, p. 2.
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1.
An anti-dumping duty may be applied to any dumped
product whose release for free circulation in the Community
causes injury.
2. - A product shall be considered to have been dumped if
its export price to the Community is less than the normal
value of the like product.

B. NORMAL VALUE
3. For the purposes of this Regulation, the normal value
shall be:
(a) the comparable price actually paid or payable in the
ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for
consumption in the exporting country or country of
origin. This price shall be net of all discounts and rebates
directly linked to the sales under consideration provided
that the exporter claims and supplies sufficient evidence
that any such reduction from the gross price has actually
been granted. Deferred discounts may be recognized if
they are directly linked to the sales under consideration
and if evidence is produced to show that these discounts
were based on consistent practice in prior periods or on
an undertaking to comply with the conditions required
to qualify for the deferred discount.
(b) when there are no sales of the like product in the
ordinary course of trade on the domestic market of the
exporting country or country of origin, or when such
sales do not permit a proper comparison:
)i)
the comparable price of the like product when
exported to any third country, which may bethe
highest such export price but should be a
representative price; or
(ii) the constructed value, determined by adding cost
of production and a reasonable margin of profit.
The cost of production shall be computed on the
basis of all costs, in the ordinary course of trade,
both fixed and variable, in the country of origin, of
materials and manufacture, plus a reasonable
amount for selling, administrative and other
general expenses. The amount for selling, general
and administrative expenses and profit shall be
calculated by reference to the expenses incurred
and the profit realized by the producer or exporter
on the profitable sales of like products on the
domestic market. If such data is unavailable or
unreliable or is not suitable for use they shall be
calculated by reference to the expenses incurred
and profit realized by other producers or exporters
in the country of origin or export on profitable
sales of the like product. If neither of these two
methods can be applied the expenses incurred and

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss2/3

2. 8. 88

the profit realized shall be calculated by reference
to the sales made by the exporter or other
producers or exporters in the same business sector
in the country of origin or export or on any other
reasonable basis.

Dumping

A. PRINCIPLE

[Vol. 4

(c) Where the exporter in the country of origin neither
produces nor sells the like product in the country of
origin, the normal value shall be established on the basis
of prices or costs of other sellers or producers in the
country of origin in the same manner as mentioned in
subparagraphs (a) and (b). Normally the prices or costs
of the exporter's supplier shall be used for this
purpose.

4. Whenever there are reasonable grounds for believing
or suspecting that the price at which a product is actually sold
for consumption in the country of origin is less than the cost
of production as defined in paragraph 3 (b) (ii), sales at such
prices may be considered as not having been made in the
ordinary course of trade if they:
(a) have been made in substantial quantities during the
investigation period as defined in Article 7 (1) 1c);
and
(b)

are not at prices which permit recovery, in the normal
course of trade and within the period referred to in
paragraph (a), of all costs reasonably allocated.

In such circumstances, the normal value may be determined
on the basis of the remaining sales on the domestic market
made at a price which is not less than the cost of production
or on the basis of export sales to third countries or on the
basis of the constructed value or by adjusting the
sub-production-cost price referred to above in order to
eliminate loss and provide for a reasonable profit. Such
normal value calculations shall be based on available
information.

5. In the case of imports from non-market economy
countries and, in particular, those to which Regulations
(EEC) No 1765/82 (i) and (EEC) No 1766/82 (2) apply,

normal value shall be determined in an appropriate and not
unreasonable manner on the basis of one of the following
criteria:

(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy
third country is actually sold:
(i)

for consumption on the domestic market of that
country; or

(ii)

to other countries, including the Community;

or
(i) OJ No L 195, 5.7. 1982, p. 1.

(2) 01 No L 195, 5.7. 1982, p. 21.
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(b) the constructed value of the like product in a market
economy third country;

importer but paid by any parry either in or outside
the Community which appears to be associated or to
have a compensatory arrangement with the
importer or exporter.

(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established
under (a) or (b) provides an adequate basis, the price
actually paid or payable in the Community for the like
product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a
reasonable profit margin.

Such allowances shall include, in particular, the
following:
(i) usual transport, insurance, handling, loading
and ancillary costs;

6.
Where a product is not imported directly from the
country of origin but is exported to the Community from an
intermediate country, the normal value shall be the
comparable price actually paid or payable for the like
product on the domestic market of either the country of
export or the country of origin. The latter basis might be
appropriate inter alia, where the product is merely
transhipped through the country of export, where such
products are not produced in the country of export or where
no comparable price for it exists in the country of export.

7.
For the purpose of determining normal value
transactions between parties which appear to be associated
or to have a compensatory arrangement with each other may
be considered as not being in the ordinary course of trade
unless the Community authorities are satisfied that the prices
and costs involved are comparable to those involved in
transactions between parties which have no such link.

No L 209/5

(ii) customs duties,any anti-dumping duties and
other taxes payable in the importing country
by reason of the importation or sale of the
goods;
(iii) a reasonable margin for overheads and profit
and/or any commission usually paid or
agreed.

D. COMPARISON
9. (a) The normal value, as established under paragraphs
3 to 7, and the export price, as established under
paragraph 8, shall be compared as nearly as possible
at the same time. For the purpose of ensuring a fair
comparison, due allowance in the form of
adjustments shall be made in each case, on its
merits, for the differences affecting price
comparability, i. e. for differences in:
(i) physical characteristics;
(ii) import charges and indirect taxes;

C. EXPORT PRICE

8. (a) The export price shall be the price actually paid or
payable for the product sold for export to the
Community net of all taxes, discounts and rebates
actually granted and directly related to the sales
under consideration. Deferred discounts shall also
be taken into consideration if they are actually
granted and directly related to the sales under
consideration.
(b) In cases where there is no export price or where
it appears that there is an association or a
compensatory arrangement between the exporter
and the importer or a third party, or that for other
reasons the price actually paid or payable for the
product sold for export to the Community is
unreliable, the export price may be constructed on
the basis of the price at which the imported product
is first resold to an independent buyer, or if the
product is not resold to an independent buyer, or
not resold in the condition imported, on any
reasonable basis. In such cases, allowance shall be
made for all costs incurred between importation and
resale and for a reasonable profit margin. These
costs shall include those normally borne by an

(iii) selling expenses resulting from sales made:
-

at different levels of trade, or

-

in different quantities, or

-

under different conditions and terms of
sale.

(b) Where an interested party claims an adjustment it
must prove that its claim is justified.
10.
Any adjustments to take account of the differences
affecting price comparability listed in paragraph 9 (a) shall,
where warranted, be made pursuant to the rules specified
below.
(a) Physical characteristics:
The normal value as established under paragraphs 3 to 7
shall be adjusted by an amount corresponding to a
reasonable estimate of the value of the difference in the
physical characteristics of the product concerned.
(b) Import charges and indirect taxes:
Normal value shall be reduced by an amount
corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

69

FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Florida Journal of
International
Law, Vol. 4,
Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1989], Art. 3
No L 209/6

Official Journal of the European Communities

as defined in the notes to the Annex, borne by the like
product and by materials physically incorporated
therein, when destined for consumption in the country
of origin or export and not collected or refunded in
respect of the product exported to the Community.
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shall be disregarded. Ordinarily, individual adjustments
having an ad valorem effect of less than 0,5 % of that
price or value shall be considered insignificant.

E. ALLOCATION OF COSTS

(c) Selling expenses (i. e.):
(i) Transport,
insurance,
handling,
loading and ancillary costs:
Normal value shall be reduced by the directly
related costs incurred for conveying the product
concerned from the premises of the exporter to the
first independent buyer. The export price shall be
reduced by any directly related costs incurred by
the exporter for conveying the product concerned
from its premises in the exporting country to its
destination in the Community. In both cases these
costs comprise transport, insurance, handling,
loading and ancillary costs.

11. In general, all cost calculations shall be based on
available accounting data, normally allocated, where
necessary, in proportion to the turnover for each product and
market under consideration.

F. LIKE PRODUCT
12.
For the purposes of this Regulation, 'like product'
means a product which is identical, i. e., alike in all respects,
to the product under consideration, or, in the absence of such
a product, another product which has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration.

(ii) Packing:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by
the respective, directly related costs of the packing
for the product concerned.
13.

(iii) Credit:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by
the cost of any credit granted for the sales under
consideration.
The amount of the reduction shall be calculated by
reference to the normal commercial credit rate
applicable in the country of origin or export in
respect of the currency expressed on the invoice.
(iv) Warranties,
guarantees,
assistance
and
other
services:

G. AVERAGING AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

technical
after-sales

Normal value and export price shall be reduced by
an amount corresponding to the direct costs of
providing warranties, guarantees, technical
assistance and services.
(v) Other selling expenses:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by
an amount corresponding to the commissions paid
in respect of the sales sinder consideration. The
salaries paid to salesmen, i. e. personnel wholly
engaged in direct selling activities, shall also be
deducted.
(d) Amount of the adjustment
'The amount of any adjustment shall be calculated on the
basis of relevant data for the investigation period or the
data for the last available financial year.
(e) Insignificant adjustments.
Claims for adjustments which are insignificant in
relation to the price or value of the affected transactions
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Where prices vary:

-

normal value shall normally be established on a weighted
average basis,

-

export prices shall normally be compared with the
normal value on a transaction-by-transaction basis
except where the use of weighted averages would not
materially affect the results of the investigation,

-

sampling techniques, e. g. the use of the most frequently
occurring or respresentative prices may be applied to
establish normal value and export prices in cases in which
a significant volume of transactions is involved.

H. DUMPING MARGIN
14. (a) 'Dumping margin'means the amount by which the
normal value exceeds the export price.
(b) Where dumping margins vary, weighted averages
may be established.

Artie 3
Subsidies

1.
A countervailing duty may be imposed for the purpose
of offsetting any subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, in
the country of origin or export, upon the manufacture,
production, export or transport of any product whose release
for free circulation in the Community causes injury.
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Article 4

2. Subsidies bestowed on exports include, but are not
limited to, the practices listed in the Annex.

Injury
3. The exemption of a product from import charges or
indirect taxes, as defined in the notes to the Annex,
effectively borne by the like product and by materials
physically incorporated therein, when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or export, or the refund
of such charges or taxes, shall not beconsidered as a subsidy
for the purposes of this Regulation.

4. (a) The amount of the subsidy shall be determined per
unit of the subsidized product exported to the
Community.

1.
A determination of injury shall be made only if the
dumped or subsidized imports are, through the effects of
dumping or subsidization, causing injury i.e., causing or
threatening to cause material injury to an established
Community industry or materially retarding the
establishment of such an industry. Injuries caused by other
factors, such as volume and prices of imports which are not
dumped or subsidized, or contraction in demand, which,
individually or in combination, also adversely affect the
Community industry must not be attributed to the dumped
or subsidized imports.

(b) In establishing the amount of any subsidy the
following elements shall be deducted from the total
subsidy:

2. An examination of injury shall involve the following
factors, no one or several of which can necessarily give
decisive guidance:

(i) any application fee, or other costs necessarily
incurred in order to qualify for, or receive
benefit of, the subsidy;

(a) volume of dumped or subsidized imports, in particular
whether there has been a significant increase, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption
in the Community;

(ii) export taxes, duties or other charges levied on
the export of the product to the Community
specifically intended to offset the subsidy.
Where an interested party claims a deduction, it
must prove that the claim is justified.
(c) Where the subsidy is not granted by reference to the
quantities manufactured, produced, exported or
transported, the amount shall be determined by
allocating the value of the subsidy, as appropriate,
over the level of production or exports of the
products concerned during a suitable period.
Normally this period shall be the accounting year of
the beneficiary.
Where the subsidy is based upon the acquisition or
future acquisition of fixed assets, the value of the
subsidy shall be calculated by spreading the subsidy
across a period which reflects the normal
depreciation of such assets in the industry
concerned. Where the assets are non-depreciating,
the subsidy shall be valued as an interest-free
loan.
(d) In the case of imports from non-market economy
countries and in particular those to which
Regulations (EEC) No 1765/82 and (EEC) No
1766/82 apply, the amount of any subsidy may be
determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable
manner, by comparing the export price as
calculated in accordance with Article 2 (8) with the
normal value as determined in accordance with
Article 2 (5). Article 2 (10) shall apply to such a
comparison.
(e) Where the amount of subsidization varies, weighted
averages may be established.

(b) the prices of dumped or subsidized imports, in
particular whether there has been a significant price
undercutting as compared with the price of a like
product in the Community;
(c) the consequent impact on the industry concerned as
indicated by actual or potential trends in the relevant
economic factors such as:
-

production,

-

utilization of capacity,

-

stocks,

-

sales,

-

market share,
prices (i.e., depression of prices or prevention -)f
price increases which otherwise would have
occurred),

-

profits,

-

return on investment,

-

cash flow,

-

employment.

3. A determination of threat of injury may only be made
where a particular situation is likely to develop into actual
injury. In this regard account may be taken of factors such
as:
(a) rate of increase of the dumped or subsidized exports to
the Community;
(b) export capacity in the country of origin or export,
already in existence or which will be operational in the
foreseeable future, and the likelihood that the resulting
exports will be to the Community;
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the nature of any subsidy and the trade effects likely to
arise therefrom.

2. The complaint shall contain sufficient evidence of the
existence of dumping or subsidization and the injury
resulting therefrom.

4.
The effect of the dumped or subsidized imports shall be
assessed in relation to the Community production of the
like product when available data permit its separate
identification. When the Community production of the like
product has no separate identity, the effect of the dumped or
subsidized imports shall be assessed in relation to the
production of the narrowest group or range of production
which includes the like product for which the necessary
information can be found.

3. The complaint may be submitted to the Commission,
or a Member State, which shall forward it to the
Commission. The Commission shall send Member States a
copy of any complaint it receives.

(c)

5.
The term 'Community industry' shall be interpreted as
referring to the Community producers as a whole of the like
product or to those of them whose collective output of the
products constitutes a major proportion of the total
Community production of those products except that:
-

when producers are related to the exporters or importers
or are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped
or subsidized product the term 'Community industry'
may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the
producers;

-

in exceptional circumstances the Community may, for
the production in question, be divided into two or more
competitive markets and the producers within each
market regarded as a Community industry if,
(a)

the producers within such market sell all or almost
all their production of the product in question in that
market, and

(b)

the demand in that market is not to any substantial
degree supplied by producers of the product in
question located elsewhere in the Community.

In such circumstances injury may be found to exist even
where a major proportion of the total Community industry is
not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped or
subsidized imports into such an isolated market and provided
further that the dumped or subsidized imports are causing
injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production
within such market.

4.
The complaint may be withdrawn, in which case
proceedings may be terminated unless such termination
would not be in the interest of the Community.
5. Where it becomes apparent after consultation that the
complaint does not provide sufficient evidence to justify
initiating an investigation, then the complainant shall be
so informed.
6. Where, in the absence of any complaint, a Member
State is in possession of sufficient evidence both of dumping
or subsidization and of injury resulting therefrom for a
Community industry, it shall immediately communicate such
evidence to the Commission.

Article 6
Consultations
1.
Any consultations provided for in this Regulation shall
take place within an Advisory Commtee, which shall
consist of representatives of each Member State, with
a representative of the Commission as chairman.
Consultations shall be held immediately on request by a
Member State or on the initiative of the Commission.
2.
The Committee shall meet when convened by its
chairman. He shall provide the Member States, as promptly
as possible, with all relevant information.
3. Where necessary, consultation may be in writing only;
in such case the Commission shall notify the Member States
and shall specify a period within which they shall be entitled
to express their opinions or to request an oral
consultation.
4.

Article 5

Complaint

Consultation shall in particular cover:

(a) the existence of dumping or of a subsidy and the
methods of establishing the dumping margin or the
amount of the subsidy;
(b) the existence and extent of injury;
(c) the causal link between the dumped or subsidized
imports and injury;

1.
Any natural or legal person, or any association not
having legal personality, acting on behalf of a Community
industry which considers itself injured or threatened by
dumped or subsidized imports may lodge a written
complaint.
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(d) the measures which, in the circumstances, are
appropriate to prevent or remedy the injury caused by
dumping or the subsidy and the ways and means for
putting such measures into effect.
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(b) Member States shall take whatever steps are
necessary in order to give effect to requests from the
Commission. They shall send to the Commission
the information requested together with the results
of all inspections, checks or investigations carried

Article 7

Initiation and subsequent investigation

out.

.
Where, after consultation it is apparent that there is
sufficient evidence to justify initiating a proceeding the
Commission shall immediately:
(a) announce the initiation of a proceeding in the Official
Journal of

the

European

Communities;

(c) Where this information is of general interest or
where its transmission has been requested by a
Member State, the Commission shall forward it to
the Member States, provided it is not confidential, in
which case a non-confidential summary shall be
forwarded.

such

announcements shall indicate the product and countries
concerned, give asummary of the information received,
and provide that all relevant information is to be
communicated to the Commission; it shall state the
period within which interested parties may make known
their views in writing and may apply to be heard orally
by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 5;
(b) so advise the exporters and importers known to the
Commission to be concerned as well as representatives
of the exporting country and the complainants;
(c) commence the investigation at Community level, acting
in cooperation with the Member States; such
investigation shall cover both dumping or subsidization
and injury resulting therefrom and shall be carried out in
accordance with paragraphs 2 to 8; the investigation of
dumping or subsidization shall normally cover a period
of not less than six months immediately prior to the
initiation of the proceeding.
2. (a) The Commission shall seek all information it deems
to be necessary and, where it considers it
appropriate, examine and verify the records of
importers, exporters, traders, agents, producers,
trade associations and organizations.
(b) Where necessary the Commission shall carry out
investigations in third countries, provided that the
firms concerned give their consent and the
government of the country in question has been
officially notified and raises no objection. The
Commission shall be assisted by officials of those
Member States who so request.

(d) Officials of the Commission shall be authorized, if
the Commission or a Member State so requests, to
assist the officials of Member States in carrying out
their duties.
4. (a) The complainant and the importers and exporters
known to be concerned, as well as the
representatives of the exporting country, may
inspect all information made available to the
Commission by any parry to an investigation as
distinct from internal documents prepared by the'
authorities of the Community or its Member States,
provided that it is relevant to the defence of their
interests and not confidential within the meaning of
Article 8 and that it is used by the Commission in the
investigation. To this end, they shall address a
wrirten request to the Commission indicating the
information required.
(b) Exporters and importers of the product subject to
investigation and, in the case of subsidization, the
representatives of the country of origin, may request
to be informed of the essential facts and
considerations on the basis of which it is intended to
recommend the imposition of definitive duties or the
definitive collection of amounts secured by way of a
provisional duty.
(c)

3. (a) The Commission may request Member States:
-

to supply information,

-

to carry out all necessary checks and inspections,
particularly amongst importers, traders and
Community producers,

-

to carry out investigations in third countries,
provided the firms concerned give their consent
and the government of the country in question
has been officially notified and raises no
objection.
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(i) requests for information pursuant to (b)
shall:
(aa) be addressed to the Commission in
writing,
(bb) specify the particular issues on which
information is sought,
(cc) be received, in cases where a provisional
duty has been applied, not later than one
month after publication of the imposition
of that duty;
(ii) the information may be given either orally or in
writing as considered appropriate by the
Commission. It shall not prejudice any
subsequent decision which may be taken by the
Commission or the Council. Confidential
information shall be treated in accordance
with Article 8;
(iii) information shall normally be given no-later
than 15 days prior to the submission by the
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Commission of any proposal for final action
pursuant to Article 12. Representations made
after the information is given shall be taken
into consideration only if received within a
period to be set by the Commission in each
case, which shall be at least 10 days, due
consideration being given to the urgency of the
matter.

5.
The Commission may hear the interested parties. It
shall so hear them if they have, within the period prescribed
in the notice published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities, made a written request for a
hearing showing that they are an interested parry likely to be
affected by the result of the proceeding and that there are
particular reasons why they should be heard orally.
Furthermore the Commission shall, on request, give
6.
the parties directly concerned an opportunity to meet, so that
opposing views may bepresented and any rebuttal argument
put forward. In providing this opportunity the Commission
shall take account of the need to preserve confidentiality and
of the convenience of the parties. There shall be no obligation
on any party to attend ameeting and failure to do so shall not
be prejudicial to that party's case.

7. (a) This Article shall not preclude the Community
from
reaching
preliminary
authorities
determinations or from applying provisional
measures expeditiously.
(b) In cases in which any interested party or third
country refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable
period, or significandy impedes the investigation,
preliminary or final findings, affirmative or
negative, may be made on the basis of the facts
available. Where the Commission finds that any
interested party or third country has supplied it with
false or misleading information, it may disregard
any such information and disallow any claim to
which this refers.

8.
Anti-dumping or countervailing proceedings shall not
constitute a bar to customs clearance of the product
concerned.

9. (a) An investigation shall be concluded either by its
termination or by definitive action. Conclusion
should normally take place within one year of the
initiation of the proceeding.
(b) A proceeding shall be concluded either by the
termination of the investigation without the
imposition of duties and without the acceptance of
undertakings or by the expiry or repeal of such
duties or by the terinaation of undertakings in
accordance with Articles 14 or 15.
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Article 8
Confidentiality
1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be
used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
2. (a) Neither the Council, nor the Commission, nor
Member States, nor the officials of any of these,
shall reveal any information received pursuant to
this Regulation for which confidential treatment has
been requested by its supplier, without specific
permission from the supplier.
(b) Each request for confidential treatment shall
indicate why the information is confidential and
shall be accompanied by a non-confidential
summary of the information, or a statement of the
reasons why the information is not susceptible of
such summary.
3. Information will ordinarily be considered to be
confidential if its disclosure is likely to have a significantly
adverse effect upon the supplier or the source of such
information.
4.. However, if it appears that arequest for confidentiality is
not warranted and if the supplier is either unwilling to make
the information public or to authorize its disclosure in
generalized or summary form, the information in question
may be disregarded.
The information may also be disregarded where such request
is warranted and where the supplier is unwilling to submit a
non-confidential summary, provided that the information is
susceptible of such summary.
5. This Article shall not preclude the disclosure of general
information by the Community authorities and in particular
of the reasons on which decisions taken pursuant to this
Regulation are based, or disclosure of the evidence relied on
by the Community authorities in so far as necessary to
explain those reasons in court proceedings. Such disclosure
must take into account the legitimate interest of the parties
concerned that their business secrets should not be
divulged.

Article 9
Termination of proceedings where protective measures are
unnecessary

1.
If it becomes apparent after consultation that
protective measures %re unnecessary, then, where no
objection is raised within the Advisory Committee referred to
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in Article 6 (1), the proceeding shall be terminated. In all
other cases the Commission shall submit to the Council
forthwith areport on the results of the consultation, together
with a proposal that the proceeding be terminated. The
proceeding shall stand terminated if, within one month, the
Council, acting by a qualified majority, has not decided
otherwise.
2.
The Commission shall inform any representatives of
the country of origin or export and the parties known to be
concerned and shall announce the termination in the Official

No L 209/11

4.
If the undertakings are accepted, the investigation of
injury shall nevertheless be completed if the Commission,
after consultation, so decides or if request is made, in the case
of dumping, by exporters representing a significant
percentage of the trade involved or, in the case of
subsidization, by the country of origin or export. In such a
case, if the Commission, after consultation, makes a
determination of no injury, the undertaking shall
automatically lapse. However, where a determination of no
threat of injury is due mainly to the existence of an
undertaking, the Commission may require that the
undertaking be maintained.

Journal of the European Communities, setting forth its basic

conclusions and a summary of the reasons therefor.

Article 10

Undertakings

1. Where, during the course of an investigation,
undertakings are offered which the Commission, after
consultation, considers acceptable, the investigation may be
terminated without the imposition of provisional or
definitive duties.
Save in exceptional circumstances, undertakings may not be
offered later than the end of the period during which
representations may be made under Article 7 (4) (c) (iii). The
termination shall be decided in conformity with the
procedure laid down in Article 9 (1) and information shall be
given and notice published in accordance with Article 9 (2).
Such termination does not preclude the definitive collection
of amounts secured by way of provisional duties pursuant to
Article 12 (2).
2.
The undertakings referred to under paragraph I are
those under which:
(a) the subsidy is eliminated or limited, or other measures
concerning its injurious effects taken, by the government
of the country of origin or export; or
(b) prices are revised or exports cease to the extent that the
Commission is satisfied that either the dumping margin
or the amount of the subsidy, or the injurious effects
thereof,, are eliminated. In case of subsidization the
consent of the country of origin or export shal] be
obtained.
3.
Undertakings may be suggested by the Commission,
but the fact that such undertakings are not offered or an
invitation to do so is not accepted, shall not prejudice
consideration of the case. However, the continuation of
dumped or subsidized imports may be taken as evidence that

a threat of injury is more likely to be realized.

5.
The Commission may require any party from whom an
undertaking has been accepted to provide periodically
information relevant to the fulfilment of such undertakings,
and to permit verification of pertinent data. Non-compliance
with such requirements shall be construed as a violation of
the undertaking.
6. Where an undertaking has been withdrawn or where
the Commission has reason to believe that it has been
violated and where Ccmmunity interests call for such
intervention, it may, after consultations and after having
offered the exporter concerned an opportunity to comment,
apply provisional anti-dumping or countervailing duties
forthwith on the basis of the facts established before the
acceptance of the undertaking.

Article 11

Provisional duties

1.
Where preliminary examination shows that dumping
or a subsidy exists and that there is sufficient evidence of
injury caused thereby and the interests of the Community call
for intervention to prevent injury being caused during the
proceeding, the Commission, acting at the request of a
Member State or on its own initiative, shall impose a
provisional anti-dumping or countervailing duty. In such
cases, release ofthe products concerned for free circulation in
the Community shall be conditional upon the provision of
security for the amount of the provisional duty, definitive
collection of which shall be determined by the subsequent
decision of the Council under Article 12 (2).
The Commission shall take such provisional action
2.
after consultation or, in cases of extreme urgency, after
informing the Member States. In this latter case,
consultations'shall take place 10 days at the latest after
notification to the Member States of the action taken by the
Commission.
3.
Where a Member State requests immediate
intervention by the Commission, the Commission shall
within a maximum of five working days of receipt of the
request, decide whether a provisional anti-dumping or
countervailing duty should be imposed.
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injury, except where it is found that this would, in
the absence of provisional measures, have

4.
The Commission shall forthwith inform the Council
and the Member States of any decision taken under this
Article. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may
decide differently. A decision by the Commission not to
impose a provisional duty shall not preclude the imposition
of such duty at a later date. either at the request of a Member
State, if new factors arise, or on the initiative of the
Commission.
S. Provisional duties shall have a maximum period of
validity of four months. However, where exporters
representing a significant percentage of the trade involved so
request or, pursuant to a notice of intention from the
Commission, do not object, provisional anti-dumping duties
may be extended for a further period of two months.
6.
Any proposal for definitive action, or for extension of
provisional measures, shall be submitted to the Council by
the Commission not later than one month before expiry of
the period of validity of provisional duties. The Council shall
act by a qualified majority.
7. After expiration of the period of validity of provisional
duties, the security shall be released as promptly as possible
to the extent that the Council has not decided to collect it
definitively.

Article 12

[Vol. 4

developed into material injury.

Article 13

General provisions on duties

Anti-dumping or countervailing duties, whether
1.
prov isional or definitive, shall be imposed by Regulation.

2.
Such Regulation shall indicate in particular the amount
and type of duty imposed, the product covered, the country
of origin or export, the name of the supplier, if practicable,
and the reasons on which the Regulation is based.

The amount df such duties shall not exceed the
3.
dumping margin provisionally estimated or finally
established or the amount of the subsidy provisionally
estimated or finally established; it should be less if such lesser
duty would be adequate to remove the injury.

4. (a) Anti-dumping and countervailing duties shall be
neither imposed nor increased with retroactive
effect. The obligation to pay the amount of these
duties is incurred in accordance with Directive
79/623/EEC (1).
(b)

However, where the Council determines:

Definitive action
(i)

for dumped products:
-

1. Where the facts as finally established show that there is
dumping or subsidization during the period under
investigation and injury caused thereby, and the interests of
the Community call for Community intervention, a definitive
anti-dumping or countervailing duty shall be imposed by the
Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal
submitted by the Commission after consultation.
2. (a) Where a provisional duty has been applied, the
Council shall decide, irrespective of whether a
definitive anti-dumping or countervailing duty is to
be imposed, whit proportion of the provisional
duty is to be definitively collected. The Council shall
act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission.
(b) The definitive collection of such amount shall not be
decided upon unless the facts as finally established
show that there has been dumping or subsidization,
and injury. For this puqxos, 'injury' shall not
include material retardation of the establishment of
a Community industry, nor threat of material
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that there is a history of dumping which

caused injury or that the importer was, or
should have been, aware that the exporter
practices dumping and that such dumping
would cause injury, and
-

that the injury is caused by sporadic

dumping i.e., massive dumped imports of
a product in a relatively short period, to
such an extent that, in order to preclude it
recurring, it appears necessary to impose
an anti-dumping duty retroactively on
those imports;

or
(ii) for subsidized products:
-

in critical circumstances that injury which
is difficult to repair is caused by massive
imports in a relatively short period of a
product benefiting from export subsidies
paid or bestowed inconsistently with the
provisions of the GATT and of the

(I) OJ No L 179,17.7.1979, p. 31.
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-

and
Agreement
on
Interpretation
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII
of the GATT, and

into the commerce of the Community after having
been assembled or produced in the Community,
provided that:

that it isnecessary, in order to preclude the
recurrence of such injury, to assess
countervailing duties retroactively on
these imports;

-

assembly or production is carried out by a
parry which is related or associated to any of
the manufacturers whose exports of the like
to
a definitive
product
are subject
anti-dumping duty,

-

the assembly or production operation was
started or substantially increased after the
opening of the anti-dumping investigation,

-

the value of parts or materials used in the
assembly or production operation and
originating in the country of exportation of the
product subject to the anti-dumping duty
exceeds the value of all other parts or materials
used by at least 50%.

or

(iii) for dumped or subsidized products:
-

No L 209/13

that an undertaking has been violated,

the definitive anti-dumping or countervailing duties
may be imposed on products in relation to which the
obligation to pay import duties under Directive
79 / 623 / EEC has been or would have been incurred
not more than 90 days prior to the date of
application of provisional duties, except that in the
case of violation of an undertaking such retroactive
assessment shall not apply to imports which were
released for free circulation in the Community
before the violation.

In applying this provision, account shall be taken
of the circumstances of each case, and, inter alia, of
the variable costs incurred in the assembly or
production operation and of the research and
development carried out and the technology
applied within the Community.

5.
Where a product is imported into the Community from
more than one country, duty shall be levied at an appropriate
amount on a non-discriminatory basis on all imports of such
product found to be dumped or subsidized and causing
injury, other than imports from those sources in respect of
which undertakings have been accepted.
6.
Where the Community industry has been interpreted as
referring to the producers in a certain region; the
Commission shall give exporters an opportunity to offer
undertakings pursuant to Article 10 in respect of the region
concerned. If an adequate undertaking isnot given promptly
or is not fulfilled, a provisional or definitive duty may be
imposed in respect of the Community as a whole.
7. In the absence of any special provisions to the contrary
adopted when a definitive or provisional anti-dumping or
countervailing duty was imposed, the rules on the common
definition of the concept of origin and the relevant common
implementing provisions shall apply.
8. Anti-dumping or countervailing duties shall be
collected by Member States in the form, at the rate and
according to the other criteria laid down when the duties
were imposed, and independently of the customs duties,
taxes and other charges normally imposed on imports.
9. No product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and
the same situation arising from dumping or from the granting
of any subsidy.
10. (a) Definitive anti-dumping duties may be imposed,
by way of derogation from the second sentence of
paragraph 4 (a), on products that are introduced

In that event the Council shall, at the same time,
decide that parts or materials suitable for use in the
assembly or production of such products and
originating in the country of exportation of the
product subject to the anti-dumping duty can only
be considered to be in free circulation in so far as
they will not be used in an assembly or production
operation as specified in the first subparagraph.
(b)

Products thus assembled or produced shall be
declared to the competent authorities before leaving
the assembly or production plant for their
introduction into the commerce of the Community.
For the purposes of levying an anti-dumping duty,
this declaration shall be considered to be equivalent
to the declaration referred to in Article 2 ofDirective
79/695/EEC (1).

(c) The rate of the anti-dumping duty shall be that
applicable to the manufacturer in the country of
origin of the like product subject to an anti-dumping
duty to which the parry in the Community carrying
out the assembly or production is related or
-associated. The amount of duty collected shall be
proportional to that resulting from the application

of the rate of the anti-dumping duty applicable to the
exporter of the complete product on the cif value of
the parts or materials imported; it shall not exceed
that required to prevent circumvention of the
anti-dumping duty.
(d)

The provisions of this Regulation concerning
investigation, procedure, and undertakings apply to
all questions arising tnder this paragraph.

(1) OJ No L 205, 13. 8. 1979, p. 19.
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(a) Where the exporter bears the anti-dumping duty,
an additional anti-dumping duty may be imposed
to compensate for the amount borne by the
exporter.

year has elapsed since the conclusion of the investigation.
Such requests shall be addressed to the Commission which
shall inform the Member States.

(b) When any party directly concerned submits
sufficient evidence showing that the duty has been
borne by the exporter, e.g. that the resale price to
the first independent buyer of the produd subject
to the anti-dumping duty is not increased by an
amount corresponding to the anti-dumping duty,
the matter shall be investigated and the exporters
and importers concerned shall be given an
opportunity to comment.

2.
Where, after consultation, it becomes apparent that
review is warranted, the investigation shall be re-opened in
accordance with Article 7, where the circumstances so
require. Such re-opening shall not per se affect the measures
in operation.

Where it is found that the anti-dumping duty has
been borne by the exporter, in whole or in part,
either directly or indirectly and where Community
interests call for intervention, an additional
anti-dumping duty shall, after
consultation, be
imposed in accordance with the procedures laid
down in Articles 11 and 12.
This duty may be applied retroactively. It may be
imposed on products in relation to which the
obligation to pay import duties under Directive
79/623/EEC has been incurred after the
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty,
except that such assessment shall not apply to
imports which were released for free circulation in
the Community before the exporter bore the
anti-dumping duty.
(c)Insofar as the results of the investigation show that
the absence of a price
increase
by an amount
corresponding to the anti-dumping duty is not due
to a reduction in the costs and/or profits of the
importer for the product concerned then the
absence of such price
increase shall be considered
as an indicator that.the anti-dumping duty has been
borne by the exporter.
(d) Article 7 (7)(b) applies within the context of
investigations under this paragraph.

Article 14
Review

1. Regulations imposing anti-dumping or countervailing
duties and decisions to accept undertakings shall be subject to
review, in whole or in part, where warranted.
Such review may be held either at the request of a Member
State or on the initiative of the Commission. A review shall
also be held where an interested party so requests and
submits evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to
justify the need for such review, provided that at least one

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol4/iss2/3

3.
Where warranted by the review, carried out either with
or without re-opening of the investigation, the measures shall
be amended, repealed or annulled by the Community
institution competent for their introduction. However,
where measures have been taken under the transitional
provisions of an Act of Accession the Commission shall itself
amend, repeal or annul them and shall report this to the
Council; the latter may, acting by a qualified majority, decide
that different action be taken.

Article IS
1.
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5,
anti-dumping or countervailing duties and undertakings
shall lapse after five years from the date on which they
entered into force or were last modified or confirmed.
2.
The Commission shall normally, after consultation
and within six months prior to the end of the five year period,
publish in the Official Journalof the EuropeanCommunities
a notice of the impending expiry of the measure in question
and inform the Community industry known to be concerned.
This notice shall state the period within which interested
parties may make known their views in writing and may
apply to be heard orally by the Commission in accordance
with Article 7 (5).
3.
Where an interested parry shows that the expiry of the
measure would lead again to injury or threat of injury, the
Commission shall, after consultation, publish in the Official
Journal of the European Communities a notice of its
intention to carry out a review of the measure. Such notice
shall be published prior to the end of the relevant five year
period. The measure shall remain in force pending the
outcome of this review.
However, where the initiation of the review has not been
published within six months after the end of the relevant five
year period the measure shall lapse at the end of that six
month period.
4.
Where a review of a measure under Article 14 is in
progress at the end of the relevant five year period, the
measure shall remain in force pending the outcome of such
review. A notice to this effect shall be published in the
OfficialJournalof the EuropeanCommunitiesbefore the end
of the relevant five year period.
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5.
Where anti-dumping or countervailing duties and
undertakings lapse under this Article the Commission shall
publish a notice to that effect in the Official Journal of the
European Communities. Such notice shall state the date of
expiry of the measure.

No L 209/15

In all other cases, the Commission shall, after consultation,
decide whether and to what extent the application should be
granted.

Article 17
Final provisions

Article 16
Refund
1.
Where an importer can show that the duty collected
exceeds the actual dumping margin or the amount of the
subsidy, consideration being given to any application of
weighted averages, the excess amount shall be reimbursed.
This amount shall be calculated in relation to the changes
which have occurred in the dumping margin or the amount of
the subsidy which were established in the original
investigation for the shipments to the Community of the
importer's supplier. All refund calculations shall bemade in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 and shall be
based, as far as possible, on the same method applied in the
original investigation, in particular, with regard to any
application of averaging or sampling techniques.
2.
In order to request the reimbursement referred to in
paragraph 1, the importer shall submit an application to the
Commission. The application shall be submitted via the
Member State in the territory of which the products were
released for free circulation and within three months of the
date on which the amount of the definitive duties to be levied
was duly determined by the competent authorities or of the
date on which adecision was made definitively to collect the
amounts secured by way of provisional duty.

This Regulation shall not preclude the application of:
1. any special rules laid down in agreements concluded
between the Community and third countries;
2. the Community Regulations in the agricultural sector
and of Regulation (EEC) No 1059/69 (1), (EEC) No
2730/75 (2); and (EEC) No 2783/75 (3); this
Regulation shall operate by way of complement to those
Regulations and in derogation from any provisions
thereof which preclude the application of anti-dumping
or countervailing duties;
3. special measures, provided that such action does not run
counter to obligations under the GATT.

Article 18
Repeal of existing legislation
Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 is hereby repealed.
References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as
references to this Regulation.

Article 19

The Member State shall forward the application to the
Commission as soon as possible, either with or without an
opinion as to its merits.
The Commission shall inform the other Member States
forthwith and give its opinion on the mater. If the Member
States agree with the opinion given by the Commission or do
not object to it within one month of being informed, the
Commission may decide in accordance with the said opinion.

Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day
following its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Communities,
It shall apply to proceedings already initiated.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.
Done at Brussels, 11 July 1988.
For the Council
The President

P. ROUMELIOTIS

('1 0J No L 141, 12.6. 1969, p. 1.
(i) 0J No L 281, 1. 11. 1975, p. 20.
(3) Oj No L 282, 1. 11. 1975, p. 104.
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ANNEX

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES

(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry coningent upon export
performance.
(b)Currency retention schemesor any similar practices which involve a bonus on exports.
(c)Internal transport andfreight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated bygovernments, on terms
more favourable thanfor domestic shipments.
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or domestic products or services for use in the
production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for delivery of like or directly
competitive products or services foruse in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the caseof
products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those commercially available on world markets to
their exporters.
(e)The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
deferral of taxes and charges referred to above neednot amount to an export subsidy where, for example,
appropriate interest charges are collected.
(f)The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export performance, over and above those
granted in respect to production for domestic consumption, in the calculation of the baseon which direct taxes
are charged.
(g)The exemption or remission in respect
of the production and distribution of exported products, of indirect
taxes in excessof those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for
domestic consumption. The problem of the excessive remission of value added tax isexclusively covered bythis
paragraph.
(h)The exemption, remission or deferral or prior stagecumulative indirect taxes on goods or services usedin the
production of exported products in excess of the exemption, remssion or deferral or like prior
stagecumulative
idirect taxes ongoods or services usedin the production of like products when gold for domestic consumption;
provided, however, that prior stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on
exported products evenwhen not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic
consumption, if the prior stage
cumulative indirect taxes arelevied on goodsthat arephysically incorporated
(making normal allowance for waste) in the exported product. This paragraph does not apply to value added
tax systems and border tax adjustments related thereto.
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excessof those levied on imported goods that arephysically
incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in the exported product; provided, however, that in
particular casesa firm may usea quantity of home market goodsequal to, and having the samequality and
characteristics as,the imported good as a substitute for them in order to benefit from this provision if the
import and the corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable time period, normally not to
exceed two years. This paragraph does not apply to value addedtax systemsand border tax adjumnts
related
thereto.
(j)The provision bygoverments (or special institutions conrcolled bygovenments) of export credi guarantee or
insurance programmes, of inmurance or guarantee programmes againstincreasesin the coss of exported
products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates,which are manifestly inadequate to cover the
long-term operating costs and lossesof the programmes.
k) The grant by govenments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under the authority of
governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have to payfor the funds so employed
(orwould have to pay if they borrowed on international capital markets inorder to obtain funds of the same
maturity and denominated at the samecurrency asthe export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of
the costs incurred byexportem or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a
material advantage in thefield of export credit terms.
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Provided, however, that if the country of origin or export is a pary to an internatonal undertaking on official
export credits to which at least 12 original signatories to the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT areparties asof I January 1979 (or asuccessor undertaking which has
been adopted by those original signatories), or if in practice the country of origin or export applies the interest
rate provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those
provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy.
(II) Ant other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the senseof Article XVI of the
GATT.

Notes:
For the purposes of this Annex the following definitions apply:
I. The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interest, rents, royalties, and all other forms of
income, and taxes on the ownership of real property.
2. The term'import charges' shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in these
notes that are levied on imports.
3. The term 'indirect taxes' shall mean sales,excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory
and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges.
4. 'Prior stage'indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making the
product.
S. 'Cumulative' ndirect taxes aremulti-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting
of the tax if the goods or services sublect to tax at one stageof production are usedin a succeeding stageof
production.
6. 'Remission' of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes.
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APPENDIX 2

The following list shows all undertakings concluded between 1985 and 1987, in order of
appearance in the Official Journal:
1985
1.
2.
3.
4.

Copper Sulphate Case (Poland), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/104 (O.J. 1985, L41/13).
Plasterboard Case (Spain), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/209 (O.J. 1985, L89/69).
Corner Fittings Case (Austria), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/443 (O.J. 1985, L256/44).
Bicycle Chains Case (USSR), EEC Comm'n Decision 85/542 (O.J. 1985, L339/63).

1986
1. Wooden Clogs Case (Sweden), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/21 (O.J. 1986, L32/28).
2. Bicycle Chains Case (PR China), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/33 (O.J. 1986, L40/27).
3. Fibre Board Case (Finland, Sweden), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/35 (O.J. 1986, L46/23).
4. Glass Case (Turkey, E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/36 (O.J. 1986, L51/73).
5. Hardboard Case (Argentina), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/232 (O.J. 1986, L157/61).
6. Deep Freezers Case (E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 2800/86 (O.J. 1986, L259/14).
7. Corundum Case (E. Europe), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/464 (O.J. 1986, L271/26).
8. Acrylic Fibres Case (Israel), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/468 (O.J. 1986, L272/29).
9. Electric Typewriters Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/490 (O.J. 1986, L283/25).
10. Silicon Carbide Case (PR China), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/497 (O.J. 1986, L287/25).
11. Potassium Permanganate Case (Czechoslovakia), EEC Comm'n Decision 86/589 (O.J.
1986, L371/84).
1987
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
22).
6.

Paint Brushes Case (PR China), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/104 (O.J. 1987, L48/45).
Photocopiers Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/135 (O.J. 1987, L54/86).
Outboard Motors Case (Japan), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/210 (O.J. 1987, L82/86).
Electric Motors Case (Rumania), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/215 (O.J. 1987, L88/53).
Cooper Sulphate Case (Poland, USSR), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/443 (O.J. 1987, L235/
Urea Case (Czechoslovakia), EEC Comm'n Decision 87/3339 (O.J. 1987, L317/1).
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